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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the Federal Elections of August 1943 the United Australia Party(UAP), which had been in 
office either alone or in coalition with the Country Party(CP) for nearly ten consecutive years 
from January 1932 to October 1941, suffered a resounding defeat.  It lost nine seats in the 
House of Representatives; its partner, the CP, lost six.  The result was a landslide for Labor, 
which won 49 of the 74 seats, giving it an absolute majority in the House for the first time 
since 1929.  Results in the Senate were equally decisive: the Labor Party(ALP) won in all 
States giving it a total of 22 Senators from 1 July 1944 against the Opposition’s fourteen.  
This was the first ALP Senate majority since 1914. 
The magnitude of the defeat rocked both the UAP and the CP to their foundations, 
though the CP survived to fight future elections.  The UAP, however, never recovered from 
the blow and its internal dynamics, already unstable due to personality feuds, leadership 
quarrels and policy differences, became dysfunctional.  Ulrich Ellis, in his A History of the 
Australian Country Party, commented that it was reduced to a ‘broken chain of aimless and 
warring groups'.1 
Immediately after this humiliating federal defeat, Robert Gordon Menzies was elected 
leader of the UAP for a second time and Leader of the Opposition, and the UAP’s 
association with the CP was discontinued.  In September 1943 Menzies suggested the 
formation of a new party, with a new name and clear-cut liberal and progressive policies, 
designed to unite nationally all the existing anti-Labor groups.2 
The concept of forming a new right-wing party was also under consideration by other 
organisations associated with the UAP, notably the influential Institutes of Public Affairs(IPA) 
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recently formed in New South Wales(NSW), Victoria(VIC), and South Australia(SA), which 
provided vital financial and administrative support.3  Stemming from these initiatives, the 
Liberal Party of Australia was formed between 1944 and 1945, under the leadership of 
Menzies.  It incorporated most of the major right-wing groups across the nation and 
absorbed nearly all members of the discredited UAP.  The CP declined to join.  The 
moribund UAP was formally wound up in January 1945 and its assets and membership 
transferred to the new party.4 
The collapse of the UAP marked an important turning point in Australian political 
history, introducing an approach to right-wing politics which discarded the idealistic tradition 
usually attributed to Edmund Burke(1729-1797) and which held that: 
the member of Parliament should maintain an independence of mind and 
position which would enable him, under the guidance of his own judgement and 
in unfettered debate in Parliament, to represent not only his own constituency 
and particular interests but the interests of the nation as a whole.5 
 
The new approach accepted the need for party discipline and a national organisation 
along the lines of the ALP.  One recommendation even included a copy of the Communist 
Party’s fighting organisation as ‘an excellent document’ on which to base organisational 
reform.6 
There is no comprehensive study of the causes of the UAP's collapse. 
C J Lloyd studied the formation and development of the party from 1931 to 1937, tracing the 
party’s origins and the pattern of its evolution during those years, and Philip Hart’s political 
biography of Joseph Aloysius Lyons, UAP leader from 1931 to 1939, includes valuable 
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analyses of party dynamics as they affected Lyons.7  These two works provide a full account 
of the origins of the UAP and the importance of the role of Joe Lyons, its first leader, but both 
close before the crucial events that destroyed the party and neither address the question of 
the party's demise. 
The major published sources of the UAP's history include biographies and 
autobiographies of the leading figures of the era: Menzies, Hughes, Casey, Curtin and 
Bruce; and autobiographies or memoirs of the protagonists: Spender, Page, Fadden and 
Menzies.  The UAP is only part of the story in these sources and related aspects are 
covered from the personal view of the subject.  But they contribute to a broader overall view 
of the pattern of the decline of the UAP by providing individual assessments and different 
interpretations of relevant party affairs and personalities.  Volume I of Martin’s biography of 
Menzies is particularly valuable in this respect, as a reliable and detailed study of Menzies’ 
career in the UAP.8 
The autobiographies betray a more subjective and selective approach than the 
biographies, and bias, circumspection or discretion are all present in greater or lesser 
degree.  The detailed accounts of their parts in UAP affairs by Page and Spender clearly 
display their authors’ values and attitudes.  Spender's autobiography provides important 
insight into the sometimes stormy UAP meetings and his book is both lively and detailed.  
But his version of events must be approached with caution as he was a participant as well as 
an observer; his relationships with his colleagues were ambivalent and his treatment of his 
own role in events is one of justification.9 
Menzies was openly selective in his memoir Afternoon Light.  His comments, however, 
though written in hindsight, are important for his evaluation of the events he addressed.10  
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Reticence, selectivity and self-justification are also apparent in Fadden’s account, especially 
on his relationship with Menzies and again, circumspection is called for in interpretation.11   
The biographies and autobiographies add to the understanding of the party, the era, 
and the interplay of people and circumstance.  The various renderings of events found in 
them reflect the discord within the party and in the Coalition; personal conflicts and 
unresolvable animosity between the Coalition parties are frequently cited as major causes of 
the failure of the party.   
The right-wing of Australian politics generally (especially before the advent of the 
Liberal Party of Australia) and the UAP in particular, has not been the subject of a great deal 
of close study.  The most comprehensive right-wing history is that of the CP by Ulrich Ellis, 
and he did not have cause to study the UAP phenomenon in detail.12  Histories and studies 
of the Liberal Party usually mention the UAP as background and occasionally speculate on 
the reasons for its collapse.  Tiver, for example, follows Hasluck in citing the unpopularity of 
Menzies and the party’s unimpressive record as factors.13  Others cite the lack of a political 
ideal, organisational failure, the party’s unimpressive record and Menzies’ unpopularity.  
Menzies himself considered the loss of three of his most able ministers in an air crash to be 
an important contributing factor to the party’s instability.14 
Consideration of the sources suggests that each of these factors played a part but it is 
not clear which were symptoms and which were causes.  In general the sources do not 
discuss the party’s demise in any detail, mainly because they have other objectives.  For 
example Hasluck commented that ‘a volume of history of Australia during the war of 1939-45 
is not the place to pursue further the political history of either the Labor Party or the two non-
Labor parties’.15 
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The collection of essays, Australian Conservatism, edited by Cameron Hazlehurst, is a 
major source focusing on the right-wing of Australian politics.  In this collection the UAP was 
the subject of studies by Lex Watson and Philip Hart, who examined the financial 
arrangements of the party and the supporting UAP finance committees, crucial factors in the 
party’s support system.  In the same collection Peter Aimer and Peter Loveday considered 
the nature of the UAP in their studies of its successor, the Liberal Party of Australia.16  These 
essays all contribute substantially to the understanding of the problems within the UAP. 
In the general histories the UAP appears as peripheral to the main narrative.  The 
leadership problems of 1939 and the party’s role in the formation of the Liberal Party are the 
aspects most usually addressed, as for example in Alexander’s and Crowley’s histories.17  
The works of Geoffrey Sawer and Paul Hasluck were more focused on the political scene, 
and Hasluck offered some perceptive comments on the party’s beginnings and some 
thoughts on its demise, but both accounts are necessarily brief and components of a wider 
study.  Jupp also provided a succinct analysis of the UAP, its record and eventual ‘collapse’, 
though without any discussion of the reasons for its disappearance.18 
Scattered and fragmentary primary sources present a problem.  According to Hart, the 
records of the UAP were destroyed on the formation of the Liberal Party in 1944-45, 
handicapping research on the party’s activities.  But, given the party’s general lack of 
organisational discipline, it is doubtful whether its records would have yielded much detailed 
information.19  The main primary sources for the UAP are the personal papers of several of 
the most prominent people connected with the party, the records of the IPA, parliamentary 
records and the newspapers of the era. 
The major newspapers of the period, such as Sydney’s SMH and Daily Mirror and 
Melbourne's Age, Argus and Herald, compensate to some extent for the lack of party 
records.  They also have their own legitimate place in the historiography by providing 
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contemporary reports of political speeches, interviews with politicians and editorial comment 
on events as they unfolded.  Though they must be approached with caution as open to bias 
and manipulation from their proprietors, newspapers are important because the politicians of 
the day took them seriously, using them both to obtain and dispense information, and as the 
main source of news and informed opinion for the public. 
There are some difficulties with the sources in general because precise information on 
the more sensitive issues is not always available.  Various accounts of relevant events must 
be compared and contrasted to try to establish the facts, making speculation unavoidable in 
some instances. 
This thesis will trace the course of the disintegration of the UAP through these 
sources, to try to fill a gap in the historiography by explaining how and why an apparently 
popular political party, which had attracted sufficient electoral support to remain in office for 
ten years in the federal sphere, was so categorically rejected by the electorate in 1943 that it 
subsequently vanished from the political scene as if it had never existed.  It will focus on the 
federal scene in the years 1939–43, from the death of party leader and Prime Minister Joe 
Lyons to the 1943 election campaign.  During these critical years the UAP suffered a series 
of internal and external disasters that betrayed its unstable structure and brought about its 
downfall. 
To provide background and to facilitate an understanding of the issues and events of 
1939-43, the first chapter will examine the origins, composition and leadership of the party in 
1931, factors which gave the organisation its character and delineated its policies.  The 
second chapter will consider how the circumstances of the UAP’s origins and the quality of 
its leadership contributed to major party disruptions between 1939 and 1943, and how these 
in turn worked to undermine its cohesion and alienate electoral support, presaging the 
party’s failure at the elections of 1943.  There were several major and minor upheavals, but 
the thesis will concentrate on those that can be seen as the most destructive: namely the 
leadership struggle after the death of Joe Lyons and the subsequent Coalition split in 1939; 
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the resignation of Menzies in 1941; the defections over the Military Service Bill; and the 
effects of the National Service Group dissidents in 1943. 
The third chapter will examine UAP election tactics of 1943 to consider how the 
divisions within the party contributed to an irresolute and indeterminate campaign that 
resulted in a comprehensive defeat at the polls.  It will focus on the most damaging factors in 
the Coalition campaign: the conflict over post-war credits; arguments over defence 
preparedness; negative anti-Labor propaganda compared to the positivism of the ALP 
campaign, which was based upon the character of John Curtin; and the effect of the entry of 
so many minor parties and independents. 
The basic argument of this thesis is that the UAP collapsed because as an association 
of diffuse anti-Labor political forces brought together under a populist leader to deal with a 
specific political crisis, it always lacked a clearly articulated political faith and failed to 
develop a federal organisation to formulate and define political principles, coordinate state 
and federal supporters and give the party a focal point.  The party was able to provide 
relatively stable, though unenterprising, government from 1932 to 1939, due to an unusual 
political climate engendered by the Depression and the absence of challenge from the 
opposition Labor party.  But in 1939 its artificial structure began to destabilise under the 
combined pressures of impending war and the loss of its popular leader.  Under these 
pressures, membership loyalties and priorities shifted and simmering personality clashes 
intensified, bringing opposing factions into open and destructive conflict, undermining then 
unseating the Coalition Government and leading to a resounding election defeat in 1943.  
The superficial unity of the party, already badly fractured, then gave way completely and the 
UAP fell apart.
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CHAPTER 1 
THE BEGINNING 
 
 
The United Australia Party was formed on 7 May 1931.  It was formed by a 
coalescence of diverse right-wing forces in response to a political and financial 
crisis amounting almost to panic, brought about by the circumstances of the 
Depression. 
The party has been described as an ‘arrangement’ rather than a political 
party, an arrangement designed to take advantage of Joe Lyons’ popularity, to 
oppose the financial policies of the Federal Labor Government led by James 
Henry Scullin, and to undermine John Thomas Lang, the Labor Premier of New 
South Wales1  It was an arrangement initiated by a Victorian financial consortium, 
and incorporated and replaced the Nationalist party led by John Latham, who 
resigned as party leader to make way for Lyons.  Lyons was selected to lead the 
new party because he had received popular acclaim for his resistance to the 
Scullin Government’s fiscal policies and because his views on finance coincided 
with those of the Nationalist Party and the financial consortium or junta that 
brought the UAP into existence. 
The opposition Nationalist Party, which had been in office since its 
formation in 1917, in coalition with the CP from 1923, was in retreat after losing 
Government in 1929.  The defeat had cost it thirteen seats, including the seat of 
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the Prime Minister, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, but it retained a majority in the 
Senate that enabled it to block any legislation of which it might disapprove. 
The political crisis was brought to a head on a wave of opposition to the 
economic approach of the Scullin Labor Government, which was in severe 
difficulties over the unprecedented fiscal emergencies of the Depression and 
which dithered between orthodox and radical remedies to deal with them. 
The Scullin Government’s difficulties were exacerbated by Lang, who 
advocated the extreme measures of compulsory interest rate reduction and 
overseas debt repudiation, measures which attracted some ALP members but 
repelled others and which were viewed with alarm by the business and banking 
worlds. 
The divisions in the ALP ran deep and on 4 February 1931 two senior 
Ministers, Lyons and J E Fenton, resigned from the Government in protest at the 
reinstatement of E G Theodore as Treasurer.  They claimed it was because he 
had not yet been cleared of allegations of ‘fraud and dishonesty’ while Premier of 
Queensland, though they were probably just as much influenced by a mistrust of 
his unorthodox expansionist financial policies.  The resignations were followed on 
13 March 1931 by the defection of Lyons and Fenton and four other members 
from the Labor Party.2  This was a drastic step, especially on the part of Joe 
Lyons, who had been a committed Labor man for 22 years3, and clearly 
illustrates the depth of the divisions in the ALP. 
Lyons was Acting Treasurer from 1930-31, during the absence of Scullin in 
Britain and while Theodore was suspended.  He had acquired a popular national 
profile by opposing in Caucus the compulsory conversion of a £28 million internal 
loan falling due on 15 December 1930 and held by Australian ‘representative 
taxpayers and citizens’.4  Lyons refused to accept the Caucus decision, seeing it 
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as repudiation and dishonourable practice, and was supported by Prime Minister 
Scullin, by cable from London.  Lyons then campaigned vigorously to make 
voluntary conversion of the loan a success. 
His campaign was aided and orchestrated by prominent Melbourne 
businessmen with ‘saturation’ advertising and promotion in newspapers, over the 
radio, in cinemas and in rallies across the country.  Lyons promoted the 
conversion loan on an emotional and patriotic basis, emphasising the principles 
of ‘sound finance’ and the honour of Australia.  The campaign resulted in an 
over-subscription of £1.75 million and was a personal triumph for Lyons, his 
actions applauded by almost every newspaper in Australia.5  It was this 
immensely successful campaign which ‘brought him [Lyons] into the limelight and 
disclosed political talents which to many seemed extraordinarily well attuned to 
the times’.6 
The success of the loan campaign and his courageous defiance of Caucus 
made Lyons the hero of the hour.  ‘Honest Joe’, as he was christened by the 
Melbourne Herald, was seen as ready to save Australia from the extremes of the 
doubtful Theodore-Scullin financial policies, which people feared would bring ruin 
to the country.7 
During the campaign Lyons had worked closely with a body of Melbourne 
businessmen known as the ‘Group’, which was to become a strong influence on 
him throughout his political career.8  The Group, impressed with his leadership 
qualities and in consultation with R W Knox, Chairman of the National 
Union(Victoria), an organisation which supported the Nationalist Party, offered 
Lyons its full support and the support of other businessmen if he would leave the 
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Labor Party with the idea ‘that he should be made leader of the Nationalists’.9  
Lyons, believing that the Labor Party’s expansionist policies would bring ‘an 
increase of unemployment, misery and destitution’ felt that he had no other option 
but to leave the Party.10 
The machinations of the select business community led by the Group and 
the National Union, to make Lyons a conservative leader were both complex and 
clandestine.  But it is clear from the evidence available that the influential 
businessmen, with interests ranging through finance, insurance and journalism, 
and who supported the Nationalist Party, were casting around for a more 
charismatic candidate than Latham to lead the conservative forces into an 
election victory against the Labor Government.11  ‘Honest Joe’ Lyons must have 
seemed the ideal candidate.  Not only would he attract the support of the 
moderate Labor voter, he was also immensely popular with the general public, 
who responded warmly to his down-to-earth ordinariness; he believed in ‘sane’ 
finance and was demonstrably a man of courage, transparently open, honest and 
reasonably pliant. 
The next step was taken at a secret meeting of the Group and the National 
Union on 13 April 1931, when Latham, under ‘severe pressure and after complex 
discussions’, agreed to resign the Opposition leadership in favour of Lyons and 
become his Deputy.12  The CP, always fiercely independent, declined to join the 
new partnership, though it was willing to co-operate with it against the Scullin 
Government.  Earle Page, leader of the CP, with a characteristic lack of artifice, 
declared that ‘the mob behind the Lyons-Nationalist Coalition are all big 
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Melbourne manufacturers, and would have no more mercy on us than on 
Latham, who they have buried alive’.13 
Though Hart and Lloyd have unravelled many of the complexities of the 
process, the means whereby the UAP acquired a leader before it became a party 
remains one of the more complicated and unedifying episodes in Australian 
political history.14  A notable corollary is that in 1935 Latham became Chief 
Justice of the High Court and there is a commonly-accepted theory that this was 
a quid pro quo for him standing aside for Lyons.15 
While Joe Lyons was going through his metamorphosis from Labor stalwart 
to conservative leader, new right-wing movements, arising from feelings of alarm 
about the Scullin Government’s perceived fiscal mismanagement, were also 
emerging.  The alarm, fuelled by the victory of the Lang Government in New 
South Wales in October 1930 and its default on interest due to the 
Commonwealth in March 1931, grew stronger and became widespread as the 
Depression deepened.  Lyons’ well-publicised loan campaign in December 1930 
and his shock resignation from the Labor Party in February 1931 increased the 
tense atmosphere and new citizens’ groups sprang up in response, calling for a 
united front against the Scullin-Theodore-Lang policies. 
Citizens’ Leagues appeared in South Australia, New South Wales and 
Victoria, the All-for-Australia League and the Sane Democracy League were 
formed in New South Wales and Victoria, together with several other minor 
organisations across the country.  During April 1931 Lyons embarked on a 
triumphal tour of the Eastern States, addressing many of the organisations in 
order to ‘put his case to the people’.16  Before setting off on his tour he had 
volunteered to Latham that he would ‘harness for political purposes the great 
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wave of feeling which the Leagues represented’.17  He drew large crowds and 
rapturous responses in Adelaide, Ballarat, Melbourne and Sydney, where he was 
acclaimed as ‘the leader Australia is seeking’.18 
The Nationalist Party and its supporting business interests opportunistically 
moved to capitalise on this political climate of patriotic enthusiasm for Lyons and 
against the Labor Government.  It arranged conferences at which Lyons was a 
prominent figure, and where right-wing organisations from across the country 
were invited to become part of the United Australia Movement.  Invitations 
specified a need to give effect to a ‘general desire of unity among all parties and 
individuals who are opposed to the dishonest policies of repudiation and inflation 
and to the destructive forces of communism’, a statement which demonstrates 
the negativity of the movement.19 
The conferences brought the separate groups together to establish the 
foundations of a new party and the process was completed on 7 May 1931.  The 
Nationalist Party amalgamated with Joe Lyons’ breakaway Labor group and the 
United Australia Movement to form the UAP, with Lyons as leader.20  The 
creation of the UAP, in the emotional and patriotic atmosphere of a crusade, 
propelled Lyons, ex-Labor Minister, into becoming the acclaimed leader of a 
right-wing populist party with vaguely-defined nationalist ideals based on loyalty 
to the Empire and opposition to Labor. 
The major role of business groups in the formation of the UAP and their 
continuing financial support indicates strongly that the Party was ‘arranged’ to 
support their anti-socialist interests as well as to meet the specific economic 
problems of the Depression.  Business interests were influential in every aspect 
of the UAP’s creation: the suborning of Joe Lyons and the amalgamation of a 
small band of Labor rebels, a populist patriotic movement and the existing 
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Nationalist Party into a right-wing party with a new look and a new name.  The 
continued support Lyons received from the backers, underscored by Menzies’ 
later determination to refuse to countenance any pecuniary involvement from 
outside financial interests when the Liberal Party was formed, support the 
conclusion that business interests exerted a strong influence over both the UAP 
and Joe Lyons.21 
These antecedents show that the various components of the UAP, 
including the sponsor bodies, were united by just two major objectives: the defeat 
of the Labor Government and the adoption of orthodox financial policies to deal 
with the economics of the Depression.  The party’s eventual collapse can be 
traced to these beginnings.  With its roots in a defensive response to serious 
financial difficulties, the implication is that once the problems were resolved the 
alliance would no longer be binding and the party would be in danger of losing 
coherence and might easily revert to factionalism. 
Its heterogeneous beginnings also ensured that the UAP could never be a 
tightly-knit organisation with clearly defined political objectives and shared 
interests, in the manner of the ALP and the CP.  Rather, it was an alliance of 
expediency, attracting members with different concerns, united only by a rejection 
of the Labor Government’s financial policies and vaguely expressed patriotic 
ideals. 
Resolutions from a special meeting of the sub-committee on policy held at 
Parliament House in July 1931 listed as policy objectives: unity of the Empire, 
support of Britain and preferential trade; maintenance of co-operation with Britain 
for defence; support for the League of Nations; maintenance of the White 
Australia policy; and resistance to communism.  These resolutions clearly reflect 
the generalised nature of the party’s objectives.22  Resolution 6 from the National 
Federal Conference held in Melbourne on 19 April 1931 disingenuously declared 
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‘The movement is not anti-Labor but is opposed to all such proposals as inflation 
repudiation and communism’.(my italics)23 
The vague rhetoric of the policies quoted above captures the very essence 
of UAP attitudes, which only rarely proposed hard edged propositions on social, 
trade or industrial matters.  It was a patriarchal ‘Trust us, we will put everything 
right’ offer to the country. 
Several names have been given to the UAP to reflect its miscellaneous 
membership: Eggleston described it as a ‘residual party’, representing all those 
whose interests did not align with the more clearly identifiable sectional parties 
like the ALP and the CP.  A ‘residual’ party attracts support from a broad range of 
people and organisations whose main unifying purpose is a desire to resist the 
more extreme policies of the vested interest parties. 
The diversity of views renders a residual party liable to factionalism and 
divisiveness, as well as propelling it into policies of negativism in opposing the 
more definite objectives of the sectional parties.24  Ulrich Ellis, a political 
secretary to Earle Page, picked up the remainder theme, mockingly calling the 
UAP the ‘party of spare parts’, a phrase also used by Archdale Parkhill, General 
Secretary of the Nationalist Party in New South Wales.25 
On these unconventional foundations the UAP went on to win the election 
of December 1931 and remained in office either alone or in coalition with the CP 
from January 1932 to October 1941, although it always lacked any but the most 
rudimentary formal organisation in the federal sphere.  The federal UAP, 
comprising only elected members of Parliament, functioned throughout its 
existence without a federal policy platform, without rules, conferences, executive 
or secretary to support it and provide a unifying influence. 
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National co-ordination of the federal parliamentary party, the major sponsor 
bodies (the National Union of Victoria and the Consultative Council of New South 
Wales) and State organisations, as well as basic policy and party management 
were left almost completely to Lyons as federal Parliamentary leader.26  In effect, 
Lyons was the UAP’s federal organisation, supported by the Deputy Leader 
(Latham, 1931-34; Menzies 1934-39) and assisted by the senior members of his 
Cabinet and the sponsor bodies.  Thus the infrastructure and national coherence 
of the UAP was an informal ad hoc arrangement, heavily dependent on the 
unique personality and abilities of Lyons, supported by the activities of the 
sponsors. 
This central function of the party leadership was the major deviation by the 
UAP from the usual concept of a democratic political party, where there is usually 
a Chairman and a secretariat to coordinate communication between the federal 
Parliamentary party and its grassroots supporters.  The result was a hierarchical 
party structure controlled from the top down, limiting opportunities for rank and 
file members to participate in decision making. 
But it was not just in his capacity as leader that Lyons was central, even 
essential, to the organisation of the UAP.  His individual characteristics of charm, 
affability, negotiating and mediating skills, combined with the industriousness, 
administrative competence and experience drawn from his days as Tasmanian 
Premier(1924-1928) made the unorthodox structure work.  When he died 
suddenly in 1939 there was no-one of sufficient status and similarly tractable 
personality to replace him. 
It is a mistake, however, to assume that the UAP’s lack of an organised 
federal political base was accidental or due to apathy or ineptitude.  Lloyd has 
shown that the UAP could have adapted the existing functional base of the 
Nationalist Party, which it had absorbed, but this was allowed to lapse at federal 
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level, though state organisations continued to operate in Victoria and New South 
Wales.27 
It can be argued that in fact the amorphous nature of the UAP suited many 
of its leading members, including Joe Lyons who, smarting from his joust with the 
ALP Caucus, was probably wary of any challenge to his authority and ‘frequently 
praised the freedom of the UAP as compared to the oppressive ALP’.  He is on 
record as calling, in emotive language, for an end to ‘the crippling fetters of the 
party system’.28 
The major sponsors were probably also reluctant to surrender any control 
or influence over the parliamentary UAP and this reluctance, together with the 
Burkean ideal held by UAP members, were powerful factors contributing to the 
continued absence of a national structure.  The sponsors clearly preferred to deal 
directly with Lyons rather than an intermediary.  It was an arrangement that 
suited them very well, given Lyons’ pliant nature, his ability to placate the CP and 
his willingness to ‘take advice’ from his backers.29 
The lack of a formal federal structure, though not a pressing concern to all 
members, did trouble some and there is evidence that attempts were made early 
in the life of the party to build a federal mechanism, attempts which the controlling 
financial groups resisted by the simple expedient of refusing to fund them.30  
They were prepared to provide administrative assistance to Lyons in his work as 
federal leader and co-ordinator of the UAP, but resisted attempts to establish a 
comprehensive national framework.  As early as 19 April 1931, even before the 
UAP was formally announced, Resolution 4 of the Australian National Federal 
Conference held in Melbourne, stated: 
That for the purpose of procuring a single organisation throughout Australia to 
secure the return of United Australia candidates the separate organisations in each 
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state be urged to appoint a representative central committee to bring about such a 
result before the next Federal Election if time permits.
31
  
 
There is no indication that this proposal was ever implemented.  In May 
1934 the Liberal Country League of South Australia suggested to Knox and 
Willis, officers of the National Union, that a national finance committee should be 
set up, but the response was that ‘no further organisation for the collection of 
funds was desired’.32  In 1941, the formation of a ‘consultative committee’ was 
suggested by Tom Hollway, parliamentary leader of the Victorian UAP, to 
facilitate the exchange of ideas between organisational members and politicians, 
but again the suggestion came to nothing.33 
Perhaps the clearest indication of the reluctance of the sponsor bodies to 
support any national framework for the UAP was the abortive attempt by Richard 
Gardiner Casey, an assistant minister in Lyons’ Government from 1933 and 
Treasurer from 1935-39, to establish a Research and Publicity Bureau. 
Casey proposed a Bureau with a director and staff, including a publicist, to 
undertake ‘long-range’ thinking on anti-socialist policy; assist the leaders of the 
‘anti-socialist’ forces in the day-to-day work of government and originate and 
promulgate effective publicity throughout Australia .  It would co-ordinate the 
advice of Departments with the extra-parliamentary bodies, and provide better 
continuing publicity instead of ‘neglecting publicity between elections’.  The 
Bureau would be located in Canberra and work in the interests of what Casey 
called the anti-socialist’ forces in federal Parliament. 
Casey discussed the Bureau with Latham in 1931 and again with Bruce in 
1932.  Latham supported the idea and suggested he (Latham) take it up with the 
Prime Minister and with the Consultative Council; Bruce also agreed that such an 
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organisation was ‘imperatively necessary’ and that the Prime Minister ‘cordially 
agrees’.34 
This was the most serious and practical proposal to form a national 
organisation and, if implemented, could have provided the party with a unifying 
and stabilising element.  It apparently had some support, though possibly 
lukewarm, from Lyons, who on at least two occasions took the proposition to the 
National Union and the Consultative Council.  But though Casey received tacit 
support for his Bureau from some very influential people, it was never accepted 
or acted upon by the sponsors ‘with Sydney crying poverty and Melbourne noting 
that it was already paying the office and travelling expenses of Lyons and 
Latham’.35 
Lloyd commented that ‘The two major sponsors concentrated their 
spending and underwriting on election campaigns, and were reluctant to fund 
organisational work of any kind.’36  That their financial support for a national 
organisation was considered essential is in itself eloquent testimony to the power 
and influence of the sponsors in the UAP, and their willingness to use it in their 
own interests. 
The actual source of funding is not well documented but there is enough 
evidence to suggest that the National Union and the Consultative Council 
employed fund-raising methods based on independent finance committees in the 
States soliciting donations from businessmen.37 
Hart claims that these committees existed in every state and that all the 
principal fields of private enterprise were involved, though their existence, and 
especially the membership of the executives, were kept as secret as possible.38  
The UAP ‘was financed in most states by self-appointed and largely secretive 
                                            
34
 Casey to Latham, 14 September 1931, Latham to Casey, 8 October 1931, Casey to 
Bruce, 5 May 1932, Latham Papers, NLA, MS 1009, Series 49/78-79, 51/15. 
35
 Lloyd, op. cit., p. 222; Hudson, op. cit., p. 82. 
36
 Lloyd, op. cit., p. 225. 
37
 Watson, op. cit., p. 73; B D Graham, op. cit., pp. 367-79. 
38
 Hart, ‘J A Lyons’, op. cit., p. 158. 
20 
 
groups of men independent of the extra-parliamentary organisations’.39  These 
donors were not giving from philanthropic motives but to support policies 
favourable to their operations: 
The chambers of manufactures of Victoria and New South Wales gave their solid 
support to the UAP, precisely on the understanding that protection would be 
retained at a level satisfactory to these chambers.
40
 
 
The ethical implications of the management of the funds by officers of the 
principal sponsor bodies are important because of the influence accruing from the 
control and expenditure of the funds.  Watson and Hart have examined the 
sources and influences of UAP funding and though there are no unequivocal 
conclusions on whether undue influence was exerted by contributors on either 
Lyons or the party, it is clear that the fund raising activities of the sponsor bodies 
were a vital component of the organisational structure of the UAP.  In this way the 
sponsor bodies fulfilled the fund raising functions usually carried out by a federal 
party organisation. 
While Hart claims, with some justification, that Lyons was the ‘most 
important single element in the party structure’, the two major UAP sponsors 
were also dominant managing forces in the federal UAP and there can be little 
doubt that without them it would have ceased to function.41  
In any study of the UAP, Lyons emerges as the linchpin of party unity and 
stability as well as the driving force for federal coordination of party supporters.  
Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the ugly struggle for leadership that 
followed his death, and in the inability of the UAP to find a leader who could 
command party loyalty to replace him.  It is difficult to assess why Lyons 
possessed this almost charismatic leadership quality when so many 
commentators dismissed him as mediocre.  Bruce patronisingly asserted Lyons 
was: 
                                            
39
 Watson, op. cit., p. 73. 
40
 Kosmas Tsokhas, ‘Business, Empire and the United Australia Party’, Politics, 24(2), 
November 1989, p. 40. 
41
 Lloyd, op. cit., pp. 224-5; Hart, J A Lyons, op. cit., p.174. 
21 
 
...a delightful person.  He couldn’t run a government but he could win elections.  
His resemblance to a cheerful koala, his eleven children, his family-man appeal 
and his essential humanity, were irresistible to the voters.
42
  
 
Or the more insightful ‘Lyons was a conciliator, a peace man, and, of 
course, a born rail sitter’.43  He was also damned with harsher criticism: 
Notwithstanding repeated avowals of loyalty to the Prime Minister by his 
colleagues, it is no secret that they do not regard him as an inspired leader.  His 
virtues in office have been of a negative order. He has given Australia humdrum 
politics.  They have not been uplifted by his leadership.  For he hasn’t cheered 
them in his struggles to make the best of things.  Mr Lyons has been a plodding 
patriot and sterling though his very ordinary gifts may be, he has neither the lilt nor 
the brisk tempo that sets the nation marching gaily forwards.
44
  
 
It would appear, then, that Lyons’ major leadership quality was personal 
charm combined with a desire to please and an ability to placate conflicting 
factions, rather than any visionary ideals.  It is a speculation that reinforces the 
idea that he was kept in power by the party’s financial backers, with the 
concurrence of the CP and its leader Earle Page, because he was amenable to 
their suggestions on policy, brought the Government a facade of national unity 
and was unlikely to ‘rock the boat’.45  His death fractured this symbiotic nexus 
and the much less pliable character of Menzies, who succeeded him, was not so 
acceptable to either the party’s backers or to Earle Page. 
While Lyons’ propitiatory and conciliatory leadership strategies maintained 
a veneer of party unity and stability, on another level, beyond personalities, it 
could be argued that the strategies undermined the party by rendering it 
ineffective.  The UAP in Government achieved little of note and functioned 
fundamentally as an administrative body rather than a policy formulator. 
In part this was due to the party’s lack of interest in policy development and 
can be traced to the absence of a clearly explicated policy direction, though it is 
generally ascribed to the need to comply with the Premiers’ Plan and to pursue 
                                            
42
 C. Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne, London, 1965, p. 208. 
43
 Keith Murdoch, 4 January 1939, quoted in D Zwar, In Search of Keith Murdoch, 
Melbourne, 1980, p. 89. 
44
 Smiths Weekly(Sydney), 30 June 1934. 
45
 Edwards, op. cit., p. 231. 
22 
 
orthodox financial and social policies to overcome the effects of the Depression.46  
But the contentious shelving of the national insurance scheme supports the 
argument that Lyons was unable to pursue definitive legislation because of 
conflicting pressures on the UAP from outside influences. 
The National Health and Pensions Insurance Bill was designed to provide a 
national, funded pension scheme and unemployment benefits.  Steered through 
Parliament by R G Casey, then Treasurer it actually passed into law in June 
1938, and the administrative machinery was put in place, but it was dropped in 
February 1939 due, according to a Cabinet Memorandum, to pressure from 
‘various sections of the community’, the need for increased war expenditure and 
a ‘risk of electoral defeat’.47 
Available evidence indicates that the legislation was never implemented 
because of resistance by the CP and the UAP’s backers, who were opposed to 
the funding arrangements.48  The fate of the scheme, the most adventurous 
initiative undertaken by the Lyons’ administration, clearly revealed the UAP’s 
inability to implement its own policies.  Menzies, who had made a public 
commitment to the legislation, resigned in protest at the shelving of the Bill, 
opening a major breach in the Coalition.49 
Lyons’ leadership strategies protected the Coalition from the breakdown 
that a more dynamic leadership might have caused, as was to prove the case 
with Menzies, but at the cost of constructive and enterprising policies, and in the 
end, of the party’s stability.  His policy of appeasement kept the UAP together, 
but prevented it from achieving any major legislative success on which it could 
look back with pride, discouraged consideration of effective policies for the future, 
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and precluded the development of a coherent and plainly articulated political 
purpose. 
A comment in the SMH on 17 March 1939, indicates that Lyons’ leadership 
approach was causing public concern: 
to hold the Ministry together he [Lyons] has had to compromise heavily, and latterly 
disastrously, on national policy.  Accepting these limitations Mr Lyons had shown 
exceptional powers of diplomatic management and resources. But it must be said 
that a more masterful leader never would have accepted them in the same degree. 
...The deadweight of CP sectionalism and inept administration, among other things, 
might have borne it [the Government] down already if there had been an alternative 
Government in sight.
50
 
 
Yet the complex conciliatory leadership style of the uncomplicated Joe 
Lyons was fundamental to the functioning of the UAP.  It was a style which his 
successor, the complicated Mr Menzies, was neither able nor willing to emulate. 
Menzies, who succeeded Lyons in 1939, led by command and demand.  
He was a successful Victorian lawyer who had served in both Houses of the 
Victorian Parliament and had been Acting Premier for three months.  He was 
seen as a likely UAP leader from the beginning of his career in Federal 
Parliament, when, in 1934, he won the seat of Kooyong, vacated by John 
Latham, and succeeded him as Attorney-General. 
Menzies’ entry into Federal Parliament was sponsored by the National 
Union as a successor to Joe Lyons, as indicated in a letter Lyons wrote to his 
wife: ‘as we induced Menzies to come in in expectation that he would succeed 
me I was quite prepared to stay out or go in according to their wish’.51   
Described as vain, arrogant and impatient with those he considered inferior 
to himself, Menzies’ condescending air aroused considerable antagonism and he 
was regarded by many as ‘conceited and ambitious for office’.  Hazlehurst 
commented that ‘Menzies seemed to be imprisoned within an image of aloof 
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superiority, of contempt for his associates and opponents’.52  But Menzies also 
had supporters who saw him as a strong, intelligent and reliable leader.  ‘Mr 
Menzies is a natural leader, a man of brilliant intellect, determined, farseeing, and 
gifted with the invaluable asset of innovation’.53 
Menzies’ resignation over the National Insurance Bill was interpreted by 
some as an attempt to destabilise Lyons and a bid for the leadership, rather than 
the matter of principle he claimed.54  As it came on the heels of a speech made in 
1938, also interpreted as a bid for the leadership, in which he appealed for 
‘inspiring leadership’ in the event of a war in Europe, he was blamed for 
hastening Lyons’ death by adding to the strain of his office.55 
Because the UAP governed in Coalition with the CP from 1934 until 1941, 
any discussion of the UAP leadership must include CP leader Earle Page.  The 
CP was a difficult and demanding partner.  The extent of its demands can be 
determined in the events after the General Election of 1931 when it refused to 
enter a Coalition without agreement on major items of policy, which included tariff 
reform, deportation of communists and the creation of new States.  Ulrich Ellis 
even suggested that the CP, with 16 seats in the House of Representatives, 
should become the official Opposition instead of the ALP with 13 seats, a 
suggestion that, though not implemented, is an indication of the party’s resolute 
independence.56 
In 1931 the UAP was able to form a government without the CP, and could 
resist its demands, but from 1934, when CP support was needed, there is no 
doubt that its policies exerted a strong influence, perhaps out of proportion to its 
mandate, on the Lyons’ Government.57 
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Page was a strong and inflexible politician, with clear ideas on his political 
objectives and a determination to get his own way.58  He is often presented as a 
‘red-neck’ character and a poor public speaker but he loomed large in Australian 
politics from his assumption of the CP leadership in 1921 until his electoral defeat 
in December 1961.59  Ellis portrayed Page as a tough, persuasive and tenacious 
campaigner and it is clear that he was a formidable opponent, not easily swayed 
by an alternative point of view. 
It was no secret that there was deep hostility between Page and Menzies.60  
Menzies despised the CP’s sectional bias, considered Page to be a boor and 
recognised that he had too much influence on Lyons.  Much of the dislike was on 
a personal level and is difficult to identify clearly in the records, except for Page’s 
remarkable outburst in Parliament on his resignation of the Prime Ministership in 
April 1939, when he accused Menzies of cowardice.61 
Martin ascribed Menzies’ dislike of Page to his ‘tough bargaining’ with 
Lyons over the Coalition, and his Country Party parochialism.  But there was 
more than politics involved in the hostile relationship between the two men; 
personalities were also involved.  Menzies apparently was not averse to openly 
expressing his contempt for Page even to comparative strangers, and he was 
given to mimicking Page’s characteristic ‘giggle’ for the amusement of his friends.  
It is quite likely that Page was aware of this and felt insulted.62  
Page also resented the fact that when the two were together on trade talks 
in London in 1938, Menzies was generally regarded as the ‘real though not the 
titular’ head of the delegation.63  Page, probably envious of Menzies’ talents and 
successes, also considered him to be treacherous and ambitious, and thought his 
behaviour, especially his resignation from the Government, to have contributed to 
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Lyons’ death.64  His discussion of Menzies in his memoirs, though discreet, does 
not conceal his hostility towards him and his ‘unconvincing and contradictory 
attitude’.65 
Between the years 1932 and 1939 the UAP and Coalition Governments 
met the initial need that led to the party’s formation, providing a non-contentious, 
non-interventionist administration, but one to which the ALP, which continued to 
suffer from factional disputes, was unable to offer any serious challenge. 
R G Casey described the Government’s approach: 
We amble along as a collection of individuals doing the obvious things that come to 
our hand—but doing no forward thinking—and generally managing to avoid or 
sidestep the difficult problems until they are on our doorstep—then we make a 
snap line-of-least-resistance decision which is usually costly, and in which we 
nearly always sacrifice principle.  Heaven knows how we have kept out of real 
trouble—probably only because the opposition, although stronger than in the last 
Parliament, is really rather ineffective.
66
 
 
During these years Lyons’ management skills and public image worked to 
retain a semblance of unity, and support for his leadership was the major unifying 
element in the UAP and in the Coalition.  But his policy of appeasement towards 
the CP and the party’s sponsors contributed to a lack of focus, other than on 
Lyons himself. The artificial circumstances of the UAP’s formation and its 
unstable nature as a residual party were exacerbated by its dependence on the 
unique qualities of Joe Lyons, and the major role of the sponsor organisations. 
In these circumstances the death of Lyons gravely weakened the UAP.  His 
demise removed one of the main unifying elements, leaving the party vulnerable 
to dissension and without the protection of a political purpose or a supportive 
national organisation to assist in the choice of a new leader.  It was the 
commencement of a steep decline, which was to end in catastrophic defeat in the 
1943 federal election.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
 
 
Lyons was the first Commonwealth Prime Minister to die in office, and this could 
excuse some of the confusion that followed his death.  But once the immediate 
emergency was over, the difficulties and dissension which arose over the 
selection of a new UAP leader, and therefore Prime Minister, can be traced to 
serious deficiencies in the party’s forward planning. 
The suddenness of Lyons’ death shocked everyone and his end came so 
quickly he had been unable to advise the Governor-General (Lord Gowrie) on a 
successor.  The UAP had been without a Deputy Leader since the shock 
resignation of Menzies only three weeks previously.  Some thought that he 
should take over as leader anyway, while others favoured Richard Gardiner 
Casey, Treasurer and architect of the National Insurance Bill, who was said to 
have been favoured by Lyons.1 
Earle Page, by virtue of his position as Leader of the CP and the terms of 
the Coalition, was Deputy Prime Minister and in this capacity took immediate 
control.  There are several versions of how the situation was resolved, but the 
outcome was that Page became Prime Minister for the next nineteen days 
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(7 to 26 April 1939).2  Page himself says that when informed of the seriousness 
of Lyons’ condition he immediately summoned for consultation those Ministers 
readily available in Sydney ‘to discuss the constitutional pattern’.  This version is 
borne out by Enid Lyons’ account of her husband’s death.3 
According to Page, Hughes, who had become Attorney-General on 
Menzies’ resignation, advised that on the death of the Prime Minister all other 
ministerial commissions lapsed.  One of Bruce’s biographers, Cecil Edwards, 
(but not Page) says that Page and Hughes then sought advice from Sir John 
Latham, Chief Justice of the High Court, who recommended that Hughes and 
Page jointly advise the Governor-General that Page should become Prime 
Minister ‘on his giving an undertaking to resign in favour of whoever was chosen 
by the UAP to be its leader’.4 
Page formed his Government on the day of Lyons’ death, without changing 
Lyons' Cabinet, and advised that he would resign his commission once the UAP 
had elected a new leader but added the rider that neither he nor the CP would 
be part of a government led by Menzies.5 
The appointment of Page as Prime Minister seems a reasonable approach 
in the circumstances, and the Argus considered it was the ‘only course open to 
the Governor-General’.6  But an undertaking from Page to resign on the election 
of a new UAP leader would have been required in case he attempted to remain 
as Prime Minister, which would not have been acceptable to the UAP. 
Page’s discussion of the issue in his resignation speech to Parliament on 
20 April 1939, makes it clear why such an undertaking was necessary.  He was 
at pains to claim his commission had been conferred upon him by the 
Governor-General without qualifications formal undertakings or signed 
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documents to indicate he had agreed to resign on the election of a new UAP 
leader.  He claimed he had then advised his Cabinet colleagues ‘without any 
pressure at all’ that he would resign as soon as a new UAP leader was elected.7  
There is more than a suggestion here that Page had considered not resigning. 
While the commissioning of Page as Prime Minister in the short-term might 
have been acceptable to the UAP, his declaration that neither he nor the CP 
would serve under Menzies immediately changed the complexion of the 
situation.  The UAP leadership choice was reduced to the level of a political 
brawl by dividing party loyalties towards the candidates on the issue of whether 
CP co-operation was essential to the Government. 
Manoeuverings and bickerings are not unusual in political leadership 
contests but they are usually kept under control by party discipline and a desire 
to present a united front in working towards the common political goal.  The 
rivalry in the UAP was unrestrained by any such consideration and rendered 
particularly bitter by Page’s ultimatum and Menzies’ alienation of support by his 
unfortunately timed resignation. 
Page’s declaration can only be interpreted as a blatant attempt to remove 
Menzies from the contest.  It was bound to antagonise Menzies and his 
supporters as well as others in the UAP, who would naturally resent the attempt 
by the CP leader to manipulate the leadership vote.  The declaration probably 
did influence the voting intentions of some members, though in which direction it 
would be difficult to say. 
Page’s attempt to remove Menzies from the contest suggests both 
arrogance and naiveté and perhaps an underestimation of his opponent.  It 
indicates that his political instincts were blunted by his personal feelings.  He 
may also have thought he could manipulate Menzies into withdrawing from the 
contest, or into giving assurances of his co-operation on CP policies, an attitude 
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that could have been a legacy derived from compliance on the part of the Lyons’ 
administration with CP demands. 
Page’s action exposed the fragility of the Coalition and the lack of 
consultative procedures between and within the Government parties.  It seems 
that he made his controversial statement without reference to his party 
colleagues because it was not until 18 April, eleven days later, that he formally 
consulted them on this important decision.  It was then unanimously supported, 
though by that time it could have been regarded as a fait accompli.8 
Hasluck speculated whether Page thought he could turn his interim 
stewardship into a long-term ministry by combining the CP with the anti-Menzies 
faction of the UAP.9  At first this seems doubtful, given Page’s oft-repeated 
comments about willingly relinquishing office to the elected leader of the UAP.  
Closer analysis, however, suggests that Page could have had personal 
ambitions for the Prime Ministership.  He did canvass the notion of a National 
Government with ALP leader John Curtin, and claimed that Curtin was prepared 
to support him until the 15th Parliament had run its course, but Curtin had also 
made it clear that he would not support a National Government.10  His comment 
‘If there could be anything worse than a government consisting of two parties it 
would be a government consisting of three parties’ succinctly summed up the 
ALP’s attitude.11 
Ellis also considered that Page could have continued as Prime Minister.  
‘Had Page chosen to do so he could have continued in office as Prime Minister 
and he had assurances of support from Curtin.’12  That the idea was current is 
confirmed by a paragraph in the Melbourne Age on 19 April, after Menzies had 
been elected UAP leader: ‘Suggestions have been made that Sir Earle Page will 
refuse to resign his commission.’  On the basis of these comments it has to be 
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considered that Page was probably a serious, if clandestine, contender for the 
Prime Ministership and that this motivated his declaration that he would not 
serve in a Government led by Menzies.  The idea of the CP leader leading the 
Coalition as Prime Minister gains credibility in view of the later development 
when Menzies resigned as Prime Minister in August 1941 and Arthur Fadden, 
then leader of the CP, became leader of the Coalition and Prime Minister. 
While Page may have indeed been a covert aspirant for the Prime 
Ministership, the obvious and principal candidates were Menzies and Casey.  
Casey, in contrast to Menzies, was well liked and, as Lyons’ Treasurer, had 
strong claims to the leadership.  His work on the National Insurance Bill had also 
brought him much support, if little success.  But he was regarded as weak and a 
‘lightweight’.13  W J Hudson describes him as a man who was liked and admired 
for his ‘industry, probity and knowledge, but not for toughness’—a plausible 
description when considering his apparently passive acceptance of the decision, 
generally considered as due to CP pressure, to shelve his major achievement, 
the National Insurance Bill.14  The abortive attempt to structure a Research and 
Publicity Bureau for the UAP is another indication of Casey’s lack of drive.15  
Hudson commented that Casey sought support for this project from the business 
backers of the UAP, rather than from party backbenchers, who might have been 
more interested.16 
Casey’s handling of these issues indicate that he was not a fighter of the 
calibre of Menzies, Page or Hughes, that he was uncomfortable with 
backbenchers and unable to rally them to his support.  His unassertiveness and 
lack of fighting spirit help to explain his ill-advised and politically damaging 
support for Page in the futile attempt to persuade Bruce to relinquish his London 
post of High Commissioner and return to Australia to become Prime Minister after 
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Lyons’ death.  Obviously Casey was no match for the powers of persuasion of 
the tough, hectoring Page. 
The attempt to persuade Bruce to return to Australia and become Prime 
Minister after Lyons’ death is one of the more curious episodes in Australian 
politics.  It has to be considered in the light of an earlier attempt by Lyons, less 
than a fortnight before he died, to entice Bruce to take over the Prime 
Ministership from him.  There is no evidence that Page was aware of this but the 
SMH of 14 April 1939 commented that ‘Mr Bruce made it clear when he was in 
Australia [March 1939] that he preferred to return to London’, suggesting that 
Lyons’ offer was not a total secret.  If Page had been aware of this earlier 
approach to Bruce it might have made it seem an acceptable, even desirable, 
solution.  According to Edwards, the earlier appeal from Lyons was made initially 
by the National Union while Bruce was visiting Australia in March 1939, on the 
grounds that ‘the Government is losing ground—mainly because it can’t make up 
its mind on any point’, an indication of the continuing proprietorial attitude of the 
National Union towards the UAP.17 
Page has chronicled in detail his efforts, aided and abetted by Casey, to 
persuade Bruce to return to Australia.  His reason, he said, was that Bruce’s 
experience and his detachment from ‘the bickerings and disputes of the 
Australian parliamentary scene naturally suggested him as the ideal figure to 
fulfil this exacting role’.  Page claimed he was prepared to resign his safe seat of 
Cowper to enable Bruce to enter Parliament.18 
It is not clear whether Casey was enlisted by Page from the beginning or at 
the instigation of Bruce.  From the evidence of the cables it seems that Casey 
may have been included in response to Bruce’s comment ‘What does Casey 
think?’ in the cable on the 12 April 1939, as though support from a respected 
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UAP member would validate the venture.  Page said that ‘R G Casey was fully in 
accord with my point of view’.19 
Hudson has claimed that Casey also asked Menzies to join the appeal to 
Bruce but, not surprisingly, ‘Menzies ... remained aloof’.20  A report in the Age 
indicated that the ubiquitous National Union was again involved, calling it ‘the 
summit of audacity’ for an outside body to attempt to ‘manipulate the election of 
a Federal leader’.21 
What emerges most clearly from this undertaking is that the main objective 
of the participants was not so much that Bruce should be Prime Minister, but that 
Menzies should not.  If, as the Age alleged, the National Union was involved in 
the project, then it seems that Menzies as a replacement for Lyons was not 
acceptable to them either, even though he had been closely involved with the 
Union in the past. 
Page’s initiative in appealing to Bruce was undoubtedly motivated by his 
hostility to Menzies, perhaps underpinned by the possibility that he himself might 
remain in office a little longer.  Casey’s motivation in joining Page in his petition 
is not so clear.  He claimed it was because ‘Australia needed a leader under 
whom all sections can unite to work to a common end ... I believe Mr Bruce is 
this man’.22  Casey, who evidently did not have the confidence to push his own 
candidature, was possibly still smarting from the failure of his National Insurance 
Bill and aware of his lack of rapport with the backbenchers.  His action suggests 
that though he was not ‘tough’ enough to take the leadership on his own terms, 
he was not prepared to support Menzies or Hughes, colleagues from his own 
party, but instead chose to go off on a wild goose chase with Page, a man from a 
different, if aligned, party, whom he perhaps should not have trusted.  Casey’s 
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support for Page in this venture suggests a serious lack of judgement—and 
loyalty, and demonstrates the weakness of party unity. 
It is strange that it never seems to have occurred to either Page or Casey 
that the position of Prime Minister was not really in the gift of either of them.  
There can be little doubt, however, that it occurred to Bruce.  He would have 
been aware that a general election was due in 1940 and that the ALP was 
gaining ground, so becoming leader of the UAP would not have had a strong 
appeal.  This thought probably influenced the terms of his conditional 
acceptance of the offer—that he was ‘not prepared to come back ... as a 
member of the UAP’ but only if he would be free to form an all-party National 
Government.23  Casey agreed to put Bruce’s terms to the UAP meeting, and to 
request postponement of the election of a leader until Bruce’s offer was 
considered.  The terms, if accepted, would have allowed Page to carry on as 
interim Prime Minister. 
The days between the death of Lyons and the election of a new party 
leader, 7 to 18 April, were filled with speculation and intrigue, and the leadership 
issue dominated newspaper headlines.  Before the entry of Bruce into the 
contest, press reports suggested that Casey was generally seen as the most 
likely choice, followed by Menzies and then Hughes.  The SMH considered that 
the dispute between the CP and Menzies over the National Insurance Bill meant 
that Menzies would not have the support of the CP, and therefore Casey would 
be the preferred candidate, then Hughes, then Menzies.24 
It does not seem from press reports that the media were aware of Page’s 
ultimatum, though the Age on 13 April reported that ‘rumours are current in 
Melbourne and Sydney that Earle Page might refuse to resign from the Prime 
Minister’s position’.  The Brisbane Telegraph favoured Casey because, though it 
thought that Mr Casey ‘may not measure up to requirements for a great Prime 
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Minister’, Mr Menzies was ‘too bound by sectional interests’ and ‘distrusted by 
the workers’ and Mr Hughes was ‘too old’.25 
The entry of Bruce into the contest changed everything.  The appeal to him, 
first made on 12 April, was quickly made public and seemed to simplify the 
issue.  The media generally applauded the move and the CP, and many in the 
UAP, supported his candidature.  It is difficult to ascertain what the electorate 
thought, but there is no evidence that he was unpopular.  But, in fact, his entry 
distorted and complicated the leadership issue to a dangerous degree, making it 
clear that the Coalition parties had doubts about the leadership qualities of the 
major candidates, Casey and Menzies.  The attempt to secure Bruce’s return 
resulted in Casey's candidature losing all credibility and put him out of the 
running.  It also severely damaged Menzies’ standing as Prime Minister even 
before he was elected. 
The newspapers seemed unaware that Bruce was only prepared to return 
as a potential leader of an all-party National Government, and not as a member, 
or leader, of the UAP.  The major papers in Sydney and Melbourne supported 
his return as UAP leader, as did Brisbane’s Courier Mail, the Adelaide Advertiser 
and the Sun News Pictorial,26 while the Hobart Mercury came out for Casey and 
considered the likelihood of Bruce’s return to be remote.27  The Melbourne Argus 
said there was ‘strong support by rank and file members of the party [UAP] to the 
suggestion that the High Commissioner (Mr Bruce) should be urged to re-enter 
Australian politics’, and it was reported that Bruce was willing to return in the 
‘national interest’, and that UAP members in all States except New South Wales 
supported the idea, because they considered that Menzies would not be able to 
secure CP support.28 
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Bruce’s election as UAP leader was presented as a foregone conclusion if 
he accepted the invitation, and Casey was assumed to have withdrawn in his 
favour.  There was also speculation about how it could be done: the Argus(12 
April)  and the SMH(14 April), suggested that if Bruce returned as leader of the 
UAP, Page should have his commission extended until Bruce could find a seat.  
The idea that Bruce might lead a National Government did not feature in the 
reports.  Curtin meanwhile enjoyed the spectacle and did not hesitate to make 
political capital out of it, saying ‘Like the rest of the people of Australia I am 
watching developments with daily increasing amazement’.29 
The momentous meeting of the UAP took place on 18 April 1939.  As 
agreed, Casey put Bruce’s proposition to the meeting, but it was rejected and the 
election went ahead as planned.  It is likely that though UAP members may have 
supported the return of Bruce as party leader, they resented the attempted 
manipulation of the election and were not prepared to delay it on Bruce’s terms. 
At the meeting Casey, Menzies, Hughes and T W White, who had been a 
Minister for Trade and Customs in Lyons’ Cabinet, nominated.  Casey’s support 
for Bruce had blighted his chances of election and probably his political future; 
he was eliminated after White in an exhaustive ballot, which, in defiance of 
Page’s ultimatum, finally elected Menzies with a small majority over Hughes.30 
But Page was not yet finished.  On 20 April 1939, before relinquishing his 
commission, he made a bitter and unnecessary personal attack on Menzies with 
accusations of cowardice and disloyalty, an attack to which Menzies replied with 
statesmanlike restraint.31  Page’s motive for making such a damaging speech, 
which many described as the worst thing they had heard in Parliament, was 
probably an attempt to discredit Menzies.  But his action suggests his political 
sagacity was blunted by anger, envy, frustration at being out-manoeuvred by a 
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disliked and more skilful opponent and the failure of his ruse to bring Bruce 
back.32 
The speech was not made on impulse, Page had discussed its contents 
with members of his party in advance, several of whom had attempted to 
dissuade him from going ahead.33  However, for a politician of his experience not 
to be aware that such an attack could only rebound to his own and his party’s 
discredit brings into question Page’s political judgement, especially his 
judgement of Menzies.  Perhaps he expected Menzies to reply in kind; if so, he 
had gravely misread his man, for Menzies was not to be manipulated in the way 
Lyons had been, either by the threat to withdraw the CP from the Coalition, or by 
ad hominem abuse. 
The attack was regretted by many in the CP and several senior members 
publicly dissociated themselves from it and refused to sit with the CP in 
Parliament.34  Page’s action caused Menzies no harm, probably strengthening 
his support in his own party, but it recoiled damagingly on Page himself, 
precipitating dissension in the CP and eventually forcing him to resign the 
leadership on 8 September 1939 in favour of Archie Cameron.35 
The inability of the UAP to manage a leadership election efficiently can be 
traced directly to its two outstanding shortcomings: the fundamental absence of 
a political manifesto or common cause and the lack of party discipline.  Political 
vision uniting the party might have reduced the primacy of personality clashes 
and some basic party discipline could have saved the situation from getting out 
of control by dissuading Casey from throwing in his lot with Page.  His bid for the 
leadership would then have gained rather than lost him the respect of the party, 
while Page would have been unable to pursue his approach to Bruce with any 
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credibility.  If that had been the case, then Page’s personal attack on Menzies 
might not have taken place and the Coalition might not have split. 
Page’s ultimatum and the public denouncement of Menzies upset the 
equilibrium of the party, but it was Casey, vacillating and under-confident, who 
demonstrated the essential weakness of the UAP’s structure.  He appears to 
have had no compunction in eschewing party loyalty and following Page in the 
vain attempt to secure Bruce’s return.   
The stormy leadership struggle intensified internal divisions between the 
supporters of Menzies, Casey and Hughes, changing party loyalties and opening 
the way to the party's eventual destruction.  It was an outcome of its failure to 
articulate and adopt a common political objective.  The inability to formulate a 
policy was reflected in an inability to choose a new leader.  In their turn, the 
leadership candidates reflected the mixed composition of the party: Menzies, the 
conservative; Casey the indecisive; and Hughes the ex-Labor man.  The 
divisions within the UAP, now clearly evident, were to bring more public quarrels 
and open enmity among party members which eventually destroyed it.  Intrusive 
factors played a part in the party's misfortunes but most of the problems were a 
direct result of the party’s internal, foundational weaknesses. 
Enormous tasks faced Menzies when he became Prime Minister, tasks for 
which his Government was not well-equipped.  The years of torpor under Lyons, 
the brutal leadership struggle, the feuding within the party and the break with the 
CP all exacerbated the problems of building an administration strong enough to 
meet the challenges of the times.  However, Menzies’ Prime Ministership began 
quietly enough on the party front and his all-UAP Government showed some 
spirit of achievement and purpose, particularly in the growing urgency of the 
defence issue and the mobilisation of manpower. 
The advent of war brought a degree of consensus to the Parliament and all 
parties agreed that the war effort was top priority.  The Government obtained, 
without difficulty, wide powers of regulation and control under the National 
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Security Bill, though not going as far as industrial or military conscription.36  Page 
then offered to renew the Coalition, an offer which Menzies rejected if it meant 
accepting Page back into the Cabinet.37  The rejection led to the leadership 
struggle in the CP, and South Australian Archie Cameron became leader.  In 
March 1940, following the Government’s defeat in the Corio by-election caused 
by Casey’s appointment to Washington, the Coalition was restored and 
continued after the election in September 1940, when Queenslander Arthur 
Fadden became CP leader. 
The declaration of war had a mixed effect on the Australian public.  On the 
one hand, they clamoured for action and criticised the Government for inaction, 
while on the other they complained about any restriction to their freedoms and 
activities, such as the rationing of petrol.38  Menzies protested that the 
appearance of inaction was a false perception because many war-related 
measures could not be publicised.  ‘There are certain secrets people cannot 
know.’39  But in spite of his protestations, hostility to Menzies’ leadership 
continued to grow, even within his own party.  On 28 September 1939, the Argus 
reported:  ‘Criticism of the Government by its own supporters is being offered 
freely in the lobbies and in the party room’.  Much of the censure in the press 
came from the CP, especially Page and Cameron.40  On 18 October 1939, 
Menzies wrote to Bruce in London: ‘though I honestly believe we have been 
doing very well under difficult circumstances, we have some newspaper critics—
notably Murdoch—while Page and Cameron are conducting specially poisonous 
public campaigns’.41  As the 1940 election approached, tensions and hostility 
increased within the parliamentary party, heightened by Menzies’ aloofness and 
unrestrained by party discipline.  Menzies complained bitterly that he had to 
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spend at least one third of his time defending himself from critics among his own 
supposed supporters.42 
The 1940 election was fought by the UAP almost completely on policies of 
increased war effort and emphasising the ALP’s equivocal attitude to defence 
issues, but a disappointing result revealed the extent of the loss of public 
confidence in the Coalition.  Two UAP and three CP seats were lost, including 
two Ministers, with the result that Menzies was forced to rely on the support of 
two independents to form an administration.43  He again tried to persuade the 
ALP to co-operate in an all-party Government but when this failed he agreed to 
an ALP proposal for an Advisory War Council, ‘representative of all parties and 
empowered to investigate advise and assist the Government in its war efforts’.44  
In another compromise and in order to form a Cabinet from his depleted ranks, 
Menzies was now forced to accept Page into his Cabinet as Minister for 
Commerce. 
In this unsettled and unstable situation, with only a tenuous hold on 
Government and the leadership, Menzies, supported by his Cabinet, decided he 
must go to London to review with the British Government urgent war matters 
affecting Australia; as he himself put it, ‘to discuss the Japanese menace and ... 
the defence of Singapore’.45  He left for London in January 1941, leaving behind 
an inexperienced Cabinet, an unstable government and an unhappy party.46 
Menzies’ visit to Britain was arguably unnecessary, and certainly unwise in 
the light of the Australian political scene.  The election for the leadership had 
shown that for many members he was not the preferred leader.  Rising 
dissatisfaction was becoming increasingly evident and was a clear indication of 
growing instability in the UAP.  Menzies was keenly aware of the hostility of 
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some party members and of the treachery of the CP.  In December 1940, W V 
McCall had called in the House for a National Government, eliciting a bitter reply 
from Menzies that constant calls for a National Government by UAP members 
were probably made more to embarrass him than from any genuine desire to 
bring about change.47  He must have recognised the danger to his Government 
of absenting himself from Australia for a long period in the unpredictable 
situation and he admitted that his wife had warned him that he was risking the 
office which he had won at such cost.48 
Menzies was away for four months and it was his absence in this critical 
period that led to his dramatic resignation from the Prime Ministership and to the 
further disintegration of the UAP.  He commented in his memoirs: ‘I had been 
absent for too long’ and Spender observed, ’his absence brought about his 
undoing'.49  While he was away the whisperings, intrigues and the dissatisfaction 
with his leadership intensified and the Coalition began to look to the genial 
Acting Prime Minister, Arthur Fadden, a leader more in the mould of Joe Lyons.  
According to Spender, moves to replace Menzies with Fadden began almost as 
soon as Menzies left and emanated principally from the CP.  Both Fadden and 
Page denied this in their memoirs, but Martin found evidence that both they and 
Hughes were implicated.50 
Menzies returned from something of a triumph in London to increasing 
unrest in his party and open resentment of his leadership.  Bitter attacks from the 
Opposition were bad enough but not unexpected; worse was the public 
condemnation by his own party that he was a political liability.  Page recorded 
that at least fourteen of the twenty-three UAP members in the House were 
known to be hostile to Menzies.51  The principal members of the UAP involved in 
the move to depose him were W V McCall, NSW; W J Hutchinson, Victoria; T W 
                                            
47
 CPD, 9 December 1940, p. 577. 
48
 Martin, op. cit., pp. 315-6; Hasluck, V.I. op. cit., pp. 313-4; Menzies, op. cit., p. 19. 
49
 Menzies, ibid., p. 48; Spender, op. cit., p. 156. 
50
 Spender op. cit., pp. 157-8; Fadden, op. cit., p. 62; Page, op. cit., p. 296; Martin, op. 
cit., pp. 364-5. 
51
 Page, op. cit., p. 295. 
42 
 
White, Victoria; and Sir Charles Marr, NSW.52  More discreet, but probably more 
influential, were senior men and Coalition Ministers, Page, Fadden and Hughes, 
while Spender and Holt also had doubts about Menzies' leadership.53 
The situation deteriorated when Menzies appointed a new Cabinet on  
26 June 1941 and UAP members from the smaller states took offence at the 
preponderance of NSW men in the new Cabinet.54  F H Stacey, (Adelaide), 
asked if it was because ‘the whole of the brain power of Australia is centred in 
New South Wales?’  Others to express their dissatisfaction with the reshuffle 
were A J Beck, and Senator B Sampson, Tasmania, and J G Duncan-Hughes 
and A G Price, South Australia, whose states had been passed over, and in July 
both McCall and Hutchinson made public statements that Menzies should step 
aside for Fadden.55 
The major expressed complaints against the Menzies’ Government were: a 
lack-lustre war effort; that Menzies himself was the main stumbling block to a 
National Government because he was unacceptable to the ALP and unpopular 
with the electorate; that he had lost touch with the rank and file members; and 
that his absence overseas had affected the confidence of Australians in his 
leadership.  It was whispered that his intellectual powers did not inspire the party 
or enable him to command respect and loyalty, and that he was aloof, ambitious; 
and too closely affiliated with Melbourne business interests, an association 
which, it was said, alienated both the Sydney business world and the ordinary 
voter.56 
In contemporary accounts of the period up to Menzies’ resignation a clear 
sign of the lack of solidarity in the UAP is that there is no indication of any 
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attempt by senior party members to deal with the whispering campaign against 
him, either in the party room or in the Cabinet, or to discipline the party and 
encourage public expressions of support for their leader.  While there is no direct 
evidence of an actual plot against Menzies, there was undoubtedly a strong drive 
to depose him. 
By contrast, Fadden was allegedly popular with the press and could attract 
voter support, though on examination this support seems to have been based 
more on his inoffensiveness than his drive or his policies.57  Most contemporary 
descriptions of Fadden say little about his administrative abilities concentrating 
mainly on his personal characteristics of affability and geniality and nearly all 
commenting on his ‘fund of risqué stories’.58  Hasluck said of him: ‘He was not 
the most experienced, or the wisest man in the CP, but he was the best 
colleague and probably the staunchest character’, while Menzies considered him 
to be ‘an exasperatingly stupid man’.59  Fadden himself is uninformative on the 
move to depose Menzies.  In his memoir he wrote only that while Menzies was 
Prime Minister he had 'the unqualified support and loyalty of myself and the CP 
... though there were strong indications of dissatisfaction with Menzies’ 
leadership both in his own party and among some influential sections of the 
press'.60 
The situation was a difficult one for a Prime Minister in a critical war period 
and with a slender hold on office and—in July 1941—Menzies was driven to take 
some definitive steps to deal with it.  He called a Cabinet meeting and a party 
meeting to discuss the growing criticisms of his leadership.  Both meetings 
resulted in a show of support for Menzies, though there were media reports of 
McCall and others speaking out against him at the party meeting.  The report in 
the SMH commented: ‘A section of members of the party strongly criticised Mr 
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Menzies, and were subjected to some interjections by Mr Menzies himself, and 
the opinion was expressed at the end of the meeting—despite Mr Menzies’ 
known satisfaction at the outcome—that things had still been left in the air’.61   
The party meeting did not directly address the question of a new leader, but it 
was suggested that if the issue of leadership arose, it should be put to a joint 
meeting of the Government parties, clearly with the objective of choosing 
Fadden as the new Coalition leader.62 
The win at the party meeting suggests that Menzies could have held on to 
the party leadership and perhaps at this time he was prepared to make a stand.  
But a new development entered into consideration.  As the situation in the Far 
East worsened and the threat from Japan hardened, Cabinet agreed, on  
11 August 1941, that the Prime Minister should return to London to take part in 
discussions on the developments.63  Menzies was willing, even eager, to return 
to England as Australia’s Prime Minister, but knew that with his slight majority he 
would need the concurrence of the whole House if he was to have any credibility 
in Britain.  Curtin was ambivalent about the idea, but the ALP ultimately refused 
its co-operation, considering that the place for the Prime Minister of Australia 
was in Australia, some ALP members interpreting the suggestion as a ruse by 
Menzies to hang on to office.64  The idea of Menzies possibly returning to 
London so soon, and the impression that he welcomed the idea, was well 
publicised and probably worked to destabilise his position further by making 
supporters uncertain of his commitment to the leadership.65 
After the rejection of the London visit Menzies, on 22 August, made a 
further offer to the ALP for an ‘All-party administration’ in which he indicated he 
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would be prepared to vacate the Prime Ministership and serve under Curtin or 
any other Labor Prime Minister.66  Curtin dismissed this offer with the comment 
that if Menzies could not provide stable government then he should return his 
commission to the Governor-General and allow Labor to govern.67   
When Curtin's reply was considered by Cabinet, the CP and some UAP 
members, including Holt and Spender, argued that perhaps the ALP would 
accept a National Government if Fadden were Coalition leader, further 
weakening Menzies' position.68  A report in the SMH claimed that at the party 
meeting McCall presented Menzies with an ultimatum: that if Menzies did not 
resign he, McCall, would see to it that the Government would be unable to 
command a majority in the House of Representatives.69  This seems to have 
been in character for McCall and would have meant a Menzies’ Government 
would be dependent on one member's co-operation, an unacceptable situation 
for any Prime Minister. 
The meetings convinced Menzies that he must resign to restore some 
stability to the Government and on 28 August he told a Cabinet meeting that the 
time had come for his departure because it appeared he had lost the confidence 
of his colleagues.70 
He officially announced his resignation on the evening of 28 August, 
blaming the rejection of an all-party administration and the fact that he was 
'unpopular with large sections of the press and the people'.71  When a further 
opportunity for him to go to London as an envoy arose, Menzies rejected it 
saying 'he was now hardly placed to speak with any authority on behalf of 
Australia'.72 
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In his memoir Afternoon Light Menzies recalls that 'there was a strong view 
that, having regard to our precarious Parliamentary position, my 
unpopularity with the leading newspapers was a threat to the survival of the 
Government' and 'a change of leadership was called for’.  He referred to party 
problems in the comment: 
A frank discussion with my colleagues in the Cabinet has shown that, while they 
have personal goodwill towards me, many of them feel that I am unpopular with 
large sections of the press and the people, that this unpopularity handicaps the 
effectiveness of the Government by giving rise to misrepresentation and 
misunderstanding of its activities, and that there are divisions of opinion in the 
Government parties themselves which would not, or might not, exist under another 
leader.  It is not for me to be the judge of these matters, except to this extent, that I 
do believe that my relinquishing of the leadership will offer a real prospect of unity 
in the ranks of the Government parties.
73
 
 
Menzies’ speech shows that his resignation had nothing to do with policies, 
political ideals or conduct, but came about from a purely personal vendetta in a 
party without any principles.  While it is likely that the CP was deeply implicated, 
it was the UAP itself, undisciplined and unrestrained, that pursued its leader with 
petty accusations of unpopularity and arrogance.  The claims of seeking an 
increase in the war effort ring hollow in the face of the strong and persistent 
efforts to destabilise and discredit the Government, and therefore the party, by 
ousting Menzies. 
Even in the circumstances of war and with a slender majority, the UAP was 
unable to unite, put aside petty grievances, personal ambition, personality feuds 
and public dissension, to provide sound government.  Though it had a 
parliamentary majority and an Opposition that was mainly supportive of non-
contentious legislation, it still lacked an ability to work together for the common 
good.  Never firmly committed to any cause, the party's fragmentation was now 
so advanced that it could not even commit to its elected leader, who himself had 
lost the confidence of uncommitted members when he proved unable to control 
the dissidents. 
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Preoccupied with the demands of office and placing the country on a war 
footing, Menzies failed to take the time to build up party loyalty, consensus and 
support for his administration, with the result that the bitterness engendered by 
the leadership battle flourished.  This, combined with the UAP's ingrained lack of 
unity, worked to prevent the party from developing a credible Parliamentary 
presence under Menzies, and Menzies from establishing a firm hold on his 
leadership. 
Martin comments that Menzies' failure to cultivate party supporters was 
possibly a major flaw in his leadership style, though understandable because he 
was not gregarious and would not stoop to foster popularity, and it is clear that 
he did not follow Lyons’ conciliatory approach.74  McCall later said that Menzies 
could have smoothed things out if he had tried: 
All he had to do was call Charlie Marr, Bill Hutchinson, and me to his office and talk 
it over and been big enough to admit that he might not have taken enough notice of 
us when we sought information.  We were only trying to do our jobs, and if he'd 
listened to our side a little we would have been right behind him.  We would have 
called it a day and he would have stayed on as Prime Minister, and history might 
have been different.  It was not a matter of compromise on his part.  All he had to 
do was follow the example set by Joe Lyons, and encourage people to work with 
and for him.
75
 
 
In these circumstances the dissatisfied party elements were allowed to 
depose Menzies in an embarrassingly public fashion.  Coming so soon after the 
egregious leadership struggle, the deposition could only gravely damage the 
party, both within its own structure and in the eyes of the public.  Spender 
commented: 
The Parliamentary UAP in 1931-41 contained quite a few outstanding men, but 
generally it was a motley collection of individuals with no common devotion to their 
party, to any governmental programme or to any deep political principles.  It had 
become more of a rabble than a political unit.  It was riddled with disaffection, 
place-seeking and trouble-making.  It had become a party of expediency.
76
 
 
Menzies’ resignation was the principal blow to the UAP's chances of 
survival.  The circumstances of the resignation left his supporters, who included 
Senators McBride, McLeay, and Leckie: Eric Harrison, H B Collett and F H 
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Stewart, bitter and resentful, while the election of CP leader Fadden as Prime 
Minister plainly exposed the UAP's political bankruptcy.  The party was revealed 
as disunited, politically irresponsible and its members unable to settle their 
differences to work together towards a common goal.  It was now well advanced 
on the road to collapse. 
The destructive pattern of behaviour that brought Menzies down continued 
unchecked because, in the absence of a strong extra-parliamentary 
organisation, no-one was sufficiently committed to try to change it.  A sound 
supporting organisation might have been able to subdue or prevent the worst of 
the attacks on the leadership and discourage intrigues among the discontented.  
If a change of leader was called for by the majority, then the party organisation 
could have helped to accomplish the change more judiciously and prevented the 
leadership of the Coalition from devolving to the CP. 
Continuing strife was inevitable after Menzies' resignation, because he 
retained the party leadership and the Defence Co-ordination portfolio and 
remained in the Cabinet.77  With his strong following and powerful personality he 
was an irresistible focus for those who did not support the new regime. 
The Fadden Government did not last long.  The circumstances of the 
resignation of Menzies had so disgusted Arthur Coles, the newest member of the 
UAP and until recently an independent, that he left the party saying the 
deposition had been 'the vilest thing he had ever witnessed'.  On 3 October 
1941, Coles and Wilson, the other independent, voted with the ALP to defeat the 
Fadden Government on a censure motion, and Labor took office under John 
Curtin.78 
The Curtin Government began by promising to concentrate on the 
prosecution of the war and Fadden offered his general support in this objective: 
'The parties which I lead will give to the new Government general support 
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towards the implementation of a vigorous war effort.’79  When Fadden was 
elected leader of the Opposition, Menzies resigned the UAP leadership in 
protest, and Hughes took his place, a token rather than an active leader.  The 
Coalition was now led by stop-gaps because the strong men in the parties had 
failed to gain the respect or confidence of their members. 
The party was outwardly quiescent for a while after the change of 
leadership, as the war situation tended to subdue political passions.  Japan 
attacked in December 1941 and this was followed by the loss of the British 
battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse in the same month.  The fall of 
Singapore, the bombing of Darwin, and the Japanese invasion of New Guinea in 
February 1942 brought the spectre of invasion of the Australian mainland closer 
to reality.80  Curtin’s leadership in responding expeditiously to the dangers with 
new and effective mobilisation increased his prestige and the confidence of the 
country in his capabilities.  His Government’s achievements quite overshadowed 
the efforts of the previous administration. 
As the Curtin Government grappled with the war situation the UAP began 
again to seethe with internal discontent.  By the opening of 1943 it was 
essentially leaderless, with the senescent Hughes filling the seat as a figure-
head and allowing Fadden to take Coalition policy decisions.  The party was still 
handicapped by its lack of a ‘defined progressive policy’ or, as Hasluck puts it, 
was in a state of ‘ideological poverty’.81  Formed in 1931 to meet the crisis of the 
Depression, under a leader who commanded national respect, the party was 
now without a unifying bond of any significance—only an urge to defeat Labor 
and regain power.  Even this objective was doubtful with Hughes at the helm.  
An ex-Labor man, Hughes carefully, even deliberately, avoided confrontation 
with Curtin’s Government, a strategy which irked many in the party.  His non-
interventionist attitude is usually ascribed to his age, but he may have been 
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happy to see Labor in office with Curtin as Prime Minister.  His leadership style 
was deliberately low-key.  He did not call party meetings and all policy and 
direction was carried out in Joint Executive and Joint Party meetings, which, 
according to Spender, were dominated by the CP.82  Some members thought the 
policy of co-operation with Labor was being carried too far and legitimate political 
opportunities to attack the Government were being ignored.  Menzies again 
became a focus of attention and rumours that he was trying to regain the 
leadership became so widespread that in April 1942 he wrote to Hughes to 
reassure him that he was not.83 
I am not proposing to become a candidate for the leadership of the Party, but if at 
any time in the future circumstances arose under which for any reason the party, 
as a Party requested me to resume the leadership, I would feel obliged to do so, 
provided I thought the request represented the real will of the Party, but not 
otherwise.
84
(Emphasis in the original.) 
 
The unstable situation gave rise to more public party quarrels.  Faction 
fights over the ‘One Army’ Militia Bill resulted in the resignations of Spender and 
Menzies from the joint Opposition Executive and led to the more serious 
development of the formation of a powerful inner group led by Menzies calling 
itself the National Service Group.(NSG)85  The NSG claimed to be something of 
a ‘ginger’ group, but many, including Hughes, saw it as a bid by Menzies to 
replace him as leader. 
The Militia Bill proposed to extend the area in which the CMF forces could 
be directed to serve, and this time it was Percy Spender who precipitated the 
trouble.  Spender, a Sydney lawyer, had first entered Parliament in 1937, and 
had been Acting Treasurer in the Menzies’ Government and Vice President of 
the Executive Council.  The Bill, the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Bill, to 
amend the Defence and National Security Acts, was introduced by Curtin on 
29 January 1943.  It revised and extended the area in which the CMF forces 
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(they were conscripts) could be called upon to serve, from the Australian territory 
northwards to a line which stopped at the Equator, and eastward towards New 
Zealand.  It was an awkward compromise between the ALP’s traditional stand 
against conscription and the demands of the war in the Pacific, but it was the 
best Curtin could extract from special ALP Conferences held in November 1942 
and January 1943 to discuss the issue.86 
Before an agreed Coalition response had been worked out, Menzies, 
Spender and Senator McLeay, the Opposition Leader in the Senate, dismayed 
Fadden by publicly criticising the Bill on the grounds that it was politically 
embarrassing that American conscripts could be called upon to fight in defence 
of Australia in areas where the Australian Government could not direct its own 
soldiers to serve.  Spender called the Bill ‘a sorry compromise between 
necessity and political expedience’.87 
Opposition policy was now firmly for ‘one army’ or conscription in all areas 
where the Japanese had to be fought, though, as Prime Minister, Menzies had 
carefully avoided the issue in the National Security Act of 1940, and Lyons had 
promised not to introduce it.  Now Fadden’s argument was that to oppose the Bill 
or propose amendments to extend further the area of conscript service might 
cause the Bill to be defeated by antagonising Labor members who still held out 
against compulsory service beyond Australia, and lose even this small 
concession. 
The Joint Executive agreed to criticise the Bill at the second reading 
(moved on 3 February 1943) on the grounds of its inadequacy, but not to vote 
against it or move any amendment.88  Spender speculated that Curtin had 
probably sounded out both Fadden and Hughes for their support for the Bill, 
advising them that this was the most he could achieve at this time, though if this 
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was the case they apparently had not discussed the approach or the decision in 
the Joint Executive meetings.89 
However, Spender later reconsidered his decision to toe the party line.  At a 
meeting on 10 February 1943, he forcefully expressed his opinions.  He said he 
would not vote for the Bill, and suggested an amendment that any member of the 
militia could be required to serve in any area the Governor-General might 
proclaim as necessary for the defeat of the enemy.90  This suggestion was not 
supported by the meeting and in protest Spender resigned from the Joint 
Executive, followed by Menzies and later the same day by E J Harrison.  On 
10 February 1943, the Daily Mirror reported: ‘The Opposition Executive, which 
formerly was unanimous against amendments [to the Militia Bill], is now split on 
the issue’.91 
The atmosphere at the various meetings was, according to Spender, 
‘vitriolic’, clearly indicating that the division in the UAP had opened up into an 
irreparable split between Hughes/Fadden supporters and Menzies/Spender 
supporters.  With the leadership of the party now practically abdicated, its critical 
lack of unity prevented the UAP from reaching a negotiated agreement on the 
dilemma.  Some members were prepared to accept an expedient political 
compromise in the interests of achieving progress on the issue of conscription, 
or, more cynically, of not ‘rocking the boat’, while others preferred to pursue a 
course in which, even if they succeeded in their objective of forcing an 
amendment, the victory would be pyrrhic, because the ALP would then vote 
against the Bill.  The party leadership completely failed to give a convincing lead 
on the issue. 
The contrast here with Curtin and the ALP is strong.  Curtin had an equally 
difficult conflict on his hands in persuading the ALP to accept even this small 
gesture of conscription, but he worked successfully to find a solution that could 
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be accepted, however reluctantly, by his party, and then piloted it through to 
accomplishment.  The UAP leadership, while having convincing reasons for 
adopting the course it recommended, failed to gain the support of all members, 
some no doubt confused by the opposing factions, or to convince them all of the 
merits of the decision.  The episode is also a clear illustration of UAP members 
claiming the right to follow their conscience, and in this Spender’s account is 
most revealing because he overtly claims the Burkean defence: 
But a man must live with himself.  There was nothing in our party’s platform, on 
which I had been elected, to compel me to vote with my party on a matter so 
critical to Australia.  Indeed I had always understood, on a matter not covered 
expressly or by implication, in the party's platform, that one was free to follow one’s 
personal convictions on an issue that one felt deeply about.
92
 
 
Menzies, less directly, followed suit saying: ‘In the long run if you have to 
make a choice between those who are with you and your own choice, I believe 
there can only be one answer.’93 
In the event amendments were moved by Menzies, Coles and Archie 
Cameron, now a member of the UAP, to leave the area of conscript service to 
the discretion of the Government.  These were easily defeated and the Bill 
passed through the Parliament unchanged and became law on 19 February 
1943.94  Ten UAP members voted against the Bill, and ten with the Government, 
a marked division that split the party irrevocably down the middle and, as 
Spender reported, ‘the UAP Parliamentary Party seemed fractured beyond 
repair’.95 
The episode was a further damaging blow to the UAP’s fragile structure 
and moved the party closer to its demise by forcing members to reconsider their 
allegiances and their priorities.  The lack of leadership and the vagueness of the 
party’s political objectives created an atmosphere of uncertainty and an inability 
to agree on a course of action in a given situation.  Leadership of the party, 
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impaired under Menzies, had almost disappeared under Hughes; both men no 
doubt affected by the party’s want of purpose and increasing instability. Hughes 
made no attempt to unite the party on the issue, offering no clear lead.  He 
failed, or refused, to call party meetings which might have achieved a measure 
of co-operation.  The party was in confusion and the leadership again in 
question.  The split over the Bill was fully reported by the major Sydney and 
Melbourne papers, further alienating electoral support and unsettling members, 
and rumours of Menzies seeking the UAP leadership were revived.96 
The next critical blow to the party was more serious.  It grew directly out of 
the conscription quarrel and would not have occurred in a more disciplined 
environment.  On 24 March, nineteen of the forty-three members of the UAP (10 
from the House of Representatives and 9 from the Senate), signed a round robin 
asking for a separate UAP meeting.  Hughes bowed reluctantly to the pressure 
and called a meeting for 25 March 1943.  A motion to declare all positions vacant 
was defeated, though supporting speeches mostly addressed the need for a new 
and more vigorous leadership.97  Martin’s account of the meeting, drawn from a 
letter from Menzies to his son in 1943, recorded: 
Friends of Menzies wanted to call for a spill of positions, but he persuaded them 
not to do that lest he be elected leader and have to face ‘the bitter hostility of a 
minority who would ... determine once more to bring me down.’ 
98
 
 
Hughes emerged from this crucial meeting still the leader, though with his 
authority seriously weakened.  Spender, whose memoir is the richest personal 
source of what went on in the UAP and joint party meetings, recorded that at the 
meeting he [Spender] expressed ‘what I thought of the contemptible manoeuvres 
in the party, the gossiping, the intrigues, the petty cliques’—a good summary of a 
party in chaos.99 
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But the vote did not satisfy the dissidents and on 31 March seventeen UAP 
members, including Menzies, announced they had formed a separate ‘National 
Service’ group within the UAP, with the stated objective of ‘intensifying the 
party's activities’.  In a letter to Hughes the NSG indicated they had no leader but 
would work under an executive of five: Menzies, McLeay, McBride, Beck and 
Harrison.100  They said they were concerned at the recent drift of events and 
Government failures in certain areas: 
the refusal of the Government to create one Australian Army to render maximum 
service to the Allied cause; the inadequate appreciation of the war effort of Great 
Britain; the alarming rise in prices which the Government is failing to control; the 
allocation of huge sums of new taxation to social services instead of war; the grave 
incidence of coal strikes, wharf troubles and absenteeism; the disorganisation in 
food and man-power; and the reluctance of the Government  to give Service 
people adequate preference.
101
  
 
The group members thought it was essential to reorganise the UAP under 
‘new and vigorous leadership’ but in order to avoid division they intended to act 
‘within the party’ but would not attend party meetings.   The letter stated: ‘The 
differences which exist between us are, we believe, less differences of policy 
than of action which would achieve that policy’.102  On 1 April they gave a 
statement to the press including a nine-point policy statement echoing their 
concerns in the letter to Hughes which emphasised the need for concentration 
on the war effort and no more tax increases for social benefits. 
The formation of the NSG was, not surprisingly, interpreted as a move 
towards the leadership by Menzies, though the SMH deplored it as ill-timed from 
both a party and a national view.103  The Canberra Times considered that the 
move could only improve Labor’s election prospects and Fadden thought the 
principal reason was Opposition attitudes to the Defence Bill, but considered it 
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was purely a domestic dispute and the CP ‘was keeping aloof’ from the issues 
involved.104 
The situation was further sensationalised when Menzies made a radio 
broadcast on 4 April defending the NSG’s actions.  This drew an angry 
broadcast response from Hughes on 6 April, attacking the NSG, but particularly 
Menzies.  Calling the NSG ‘party wreckers’ and Menzies ‘the great self-seeker, 
the man behind the scenes in every intrigue, the fountain head of every 
whispering campaign, the destroyer of unity’, Hughes complained bitterly of the 
NSG’s lack of loyalty and insisted that its only purpose was to depose him as 
party leader, put Menzies in his place, then to depose Fadden as Coalition 
leader.105  Menzies’ response described Hughes’ broadcast as ‘full of 
inaccuracies and reeking with evil suggestions’ but said he refused to become 
involved in a competition of personal abuse which between two former Prime 
Ministers would be ‘deplorable’ and in the present circumstances 
‘unpardonable’.106  Menzies took to the air again on 9 April to explain ‘Why we 
did it’ and on 13 April Keith Murdoch wrote: ‘The formation of the Group has 
been attended by the fumes and furies of seismic disturbances’.  He also 
criticised the Opposition leaders for ‘sinking principles for the sake of avoiding an 
election’.107 
The public feuding between senior party men was not likely to inspire 
confidence in the UAP as a reliable team to lead the country in a time of war.  Its 
fundamental lack of principles and of coherence were now seriously threatening 
its survival.  It is likely that some federal UAP members were unsure of their 
loyalties and reluctant to join in the public faction fighting because it would be 
unpatriotic to cause further instability in the Parliament during wartime.108 
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Murdoch defended Menzies’ part in the formation of the Group, claiming he 
was ‘not a party to these developments’.  ‘The round robin’, he wrote, ‘initiating 
the attack on Mr Hughes was well on its way before he knew of it’.109  Menzies 
also denied that he had anything to do with the ‘round robin’, but, given his 
fabled astuteness, it is hard to accept his claim of innocence. 
The formation of the NSG was a direct attack on the party’s frail unity and 
the fault lines laid down at its inception now widened into open and deep 
divisions, resulting in calls to expel group members.110  Menzies’ and Hughes’ 
public quarrel gave the electorate firm evidence of the party’s degeneration and 
added to the perception of Curtin and his Government as the more responsible 
party. 
The NSG sprang from the dissatisfaction of members at the continuing lack 
of direction, uncertainties and conflicting loyalties within the UAP.  But in an effort 
to revitalise the party and provide a clear purpose other than merely reacting to 
circumstances, the formation of the NSG completed the destruction of party unity 
and, in effect, sealed its fate by dividing it into two separate camps. 
The NSG had little chance to ‘ginger up’ the Opposition.  On  
22 June Fadden moved a vote of no confidence, which initiated a three-day 
debate and was defeated by the Government by only one vote.111  The motion 
was immediately followed on 24 June by a lengthy and difficult debate on the 
‘Brisbane Line’.  The destructive ‘Brisbane Line’ accusations had first surfaced in 
October 1942, promulgated by E J (Eddie) Ward, Curtin’s Minister for Labor and 
National Service, and an ex-Lang Group politician.  The allegations were, that in 
the event of a Japanese invasion, the Menzies and Fadden Governments had 
made plans to withdraw to a so-called ‘Brisbane Line’, leaving the north of 
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Australia undefended.112  Though later disproved, these charges received wide 
publicity, severely damaging the UAP’s already doubtful reputation.  The party’s 
generally disorganised condition precluded a convincing rebuttal and the affair 
was to prove another element in the UAP’s demise.  The debate resulted in a 
decision to constitute a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the matter and later the 
same day Curtin gave notice that he would call a general election, which was 
held on 21 August 1943.113
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CHAPTER 3 
THE END 
 
 
The state of the UAP did not augur well for the forthcoming election, which, 
though called suddenly, was in any case due in November 1943, and so was not 
entirely unexpected.  The party’s parliamentary fragmentation was complicated 
by its systemic lack of an effective national organisation to unify the warring 
members and galvanise and co-ordinate a national election campaign.  These 
were handicaps enough and they were compounded by the fact that apart from 
periodical election policies, the party had never had a comprehensive statement 
of political objectives.  Put simply, it did not appear to believe sincerely in 
anything. 
The Parliamentary party itself, the nerve-centre of the organisation, was 
now seriously divided, effectively leaderless and without a formal communication 
system.  Members sat more as a group of individuals than as a coherent political 
party.  It had nothing to offer the electorate: not leadership, not policies, not a 
future, only criticism of, or reaction to, ALP policies. 
Fadden had announced the Coalition’s election platform ‘approved recently 
at the meeting in Sydney of the Federal Opposition executive’ on 5 May 1943.  It 
emphasised ‘loyalty to the Throne, Commonwealth and Empire’ pledged all 
resources to the gaining of victory and promised to work towards a national 
government, one army and freedom from ‘doctrinaire, socialistic restrictions’.1 
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As a major political force with aspirations for defeating the incumbent 
government, it was natural that the Coalition should be preparing for an election, 
but the party seemed to be unaware of the mood of the country and the 
deleterious effects of disunity on public opinion.  Certainly the main participants 
appear to have been out of touch with the reality of the situation.  Fadden 
‘seemed quite sanguine’ that the Coalition would win the election and he would 
again be Prime Minister with Hughes as his Deputy.2 
Menzies, too, was quietly confident and said he did not discern a swing to 
Labor and felt that ‘the Government might be defeated’.  Fadden and Menzies 
were not alone in misreading the situation: Curtin said he was ‘in the dark’ about 
the results, and when it came it was a ‘staggering surprise to him’.3  Frank 
Packer, owner of the Sydney Daily Telegraph, was also convinced that the 
Coalition would win.4  Spender however, though perhaps speaking from 
hindsight, commented ‘we were a doomed party, with no basic political 
philosophy to bind us together, a patchwork quilt of disparate and irreconcilable 
personalities’.5 
The absence of a functional electoral organisation to alert the parliamentary 
party to the mood of the electorate was probably the cause of the complacency in 
the UAP.  With no early warning signals from the constituencies, the party was 
unaware of the damage its public quarrels were causing.  It also failed to 
recognise the growing popularity and respect for John Curtin as a national leader 
and for the achievements of his Government in conducting the war effort.  The 
party was still in confusion from its recent factional fights, and as the Joint 
Opposition Executive apparently decided policy without reference to members, 
an ineffectual and indecisive campaign was the inevitable result. 
Fadden led the Coalition campaign as leader of the Joint Opposition and 
leader of the CP, while Hughes led for the UAP.  Sawer claims that on the 
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announcement of the election the Coalition formally settled the disruptive faction 
fight between Menzies’ NSG and the Fadden-Hughes followers.  Fitzhardinge 
also commented that ‘the quarrel between the NSG and the Opposition leaders 
was hastily patched up’ and on 19 June the Canberra Times reported ‘there is 
some evidence of a closing of ranks and a closer relationship between the NSG 
and the remainder of the Opposition parties is expected’.6 
Spender’s account, however, does not seem to support a reconciliation.  
Writing of a joint party meeting held on 1 July 1943, soon after the announcement 
of the election, he described a far from united gathering and a threat from the 
NSG to walk out if a vote of confidence in the Fadden-Hughes leadership was 
called.7  If accord was reached before the campaign began, it did not last long 
and once more the antagonisms and hostility between and within the Coalition 
parties was publicly displayed, further threatening its credibility. 
The discord broke out in an open breach between Fadden and Menzies at 
the beginning of the campaign, which Fadden opened on 22 July in Brisbane.  
His speech was unremarkable and predictable, following the major Opposition 
line of attacking the Government’s policies.  He persisted in calls for a National 
Government, claimed that any defence achievements of the Curtin administration 
rested on the solid military and economic foundations laid by the Menzies and 
Fadden Administrations, and attacked Labor for, inter alia, its failure to prevent 
strikes, for ‘regulation mania’, mismanagement of rural policy, using wartime 
Government powers for promoting socialist objectives, and for an inflationary 
financial policy.  He also proposed a system of post-war credits, with a specific 
promise that one-third of all income tax collected after June 30 1942 would be 
repaid in cash by instalments when the war was over, a promise described by 
journalist Ross Gollan as the speech’s ‘chief bribe’.8  Some papers headlined the 
post-war credits proposal as an important policy initiative but the issue does not 
                                            
6
 Sawer, op. cit., p. 155.  Fitzhardinge, op. cit., p. 662. 
7
 Spender, op. cit., p. 219. 
8
 SMH, 23 August 1943. 
62 
 
appear to have assumed major proportions until Menzies made his opening 
campaign speech on the following day.9 
Menzies, who many UAP candidates still regarded as the true leader of the 
party, opened his campaign in Kooyong, his Victorian electorate, on 23 July 
1943.10  Sometime during the evening he rejected Fadden’s post-war credits 
proposal as inflationary: 
There is one part to which I am not able to subscribe, I cannot agree with the 
suggestion that there should be a taxation refund retrospective to 1942.  Complete 
honesty requires that I should say that I cannot subscribe to that proposal.  We 
need every shilling that can be obtained from the Australian people to win the 
war.
11
 
 
It is not clear how Menzies came to make these comments.  They were not 
part of his prepared speech or the broadcast version, nor was it mentioned in the 
major press reports.12  On 26 July, the Argus reported that Menzies made the 
comments ‘after consultation with several of his colleagues’ in an unplanned 
preface to his prepared speech and after he had heard Fadden’s policy speech.13  
Menzies claimed that he made the comments in response to a question, 
presumably at the end of the meeting.14  However, neither a question nor a 
preface on the subject is mentioned in the following day’s reports, though the Age 
reported a ‘barrage of questions’ and the Argus, which gave a very full account 
and a supportive editorial on Menzies’ speech, mentioned a question ‘at the end 
of the speech’ about the ‘Brisbane Line’.15  
On the evidence it seems reasonable to assume that Menzies’ comments 
were probably made extempore, but they could have been carefully 
premeditated, as Fadden suspected.  In any case they could not have done as 
much damage as Fadden’s rash response. 
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According to the SMH, Fadden was informed of Menzies’ comments ‘when 
he was awakened in Brisbane at 2.30am on Saturday’.16  While one can 
sympathise with him for being disturbed at such an hour, perhaps he would have 
been wiser to have exercised more discretion.  Instead he impetuously accused 
Menzies of ‘stabbing him in the back’. 
This stab in the back at this juncture makes another betrayal in the series for which 
Mr Menzies has become notorious. The statement comes as no surprise to me, for 
I heard last week in Sydney that some such thing might happen because the 
personal ambition of one man thought it preferable that we should lose this 
election.
17
 
 
Fadden wrote little about this episode in his memoirs, only that he was 
‘goaded’ into the outburst, while Menzies claimed that he ‘knew nothing’ of 
Fadden’s post-war credits proposal, as he was not a member of the Opposition 
Executive which had formulated the policy.18  Two Victorian UAP Senators, 
Leckie, (Menzies’ father-in-law) and Spicer, supported Menzies, and Spender’s 
account lends credibility to his version.  Spender recorded that Fadden, before 
delivering his speech, had asked him, Spender, for his comments, but when 
Spender expressed misgivings about the post-war credits proposal, Fadden 
insisted that they could not be changed because they had been approved by the 
Joint Party Executive, of which neither Menzies nor Spender were then members.  
As Spender put it, the speech had been ‘settled with his advisers, whoever they 
were, and approved by the joint Opposition Executive’.19  This suggests the 
curious situation that the Executive did not consider it necessary to advise party 
members of principal points of policy.  All in all it was a most damaging incident 
and Ellis claimed that this episode made the result of the election ‘a foregone 
conclusion’.20 
While the UAP and CP hastily and, as it turned out, inadequately, patched 
up their differences to face the electorate, the ALP faced the country essentially 
united in organisation and policy, with a strong and popular leader.  As the 
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wartime Government, Curtin and his team had succeeded in impressing the 
public with their competence, managing the difficult war situation well and 
building an image of a capable, knowledgeable and determined group that had 
come into office to pick up the pieces left by an incompetent Coalition. 
The ‘Brisbane Line’ argument ensured that defence preparedness was the 
major election issue to emerge.  But the issue of leadership also gained 
prominence.  Menzies was now a private member holding no office in the 
Opposition, yet the focus was on him versus Curtin as wartime leaders.  The 
Labor party promoted John Curtin as the saviour of Australia, and, in contrast, the 
Governments led by Menzies and Fadden were portrayed as passively defeatist.  
Every Labor advertisement featured a picture of Curtin looking sober but 
determined, or, as one paper put it, ‘smug and unctuous and very very 
righteous’.21 
There is little doubt that Curtin had earned the admiration of the country for 
his conduct as Prime Minister.  Even his opponents admired him, Sir Herbert 
Gepp of the IPA wrote: 
Labour had a trump card in the Election in the leader, Mr John Curtin ... Mr Curtin 
has won the respect of the nation for his moderation, his patience, his persistence 
and his courage in the most desperate year of Australia’s brief history ... He has 
shown drive, organising ability and a little of the ruthlessness which is necessary 
when things must be done and done quickly. 
22
 
 
And the SMH wrote: 
He [Curtin] is a man, unambitious but high-principled, of considerable ability, 
stronger and more decisive than his quiet manner suggests, anxious to give any 
matter a calm and judicial decision, and above all determined to win the war for his 
country and for humanity.  We could not choose a better leader today.
23
 
 
Curtin broadcast his policy speech from Canberra on 27 July 1943.  He 
emphasised the record of his Government in building up the defence of Australia 
on the fighting front and on the home front, while pointing out the defence 
deficiencies of the previous Governments, especially regarding war in the Pacific.  
According to Curtin, Labor had inherited a heavy defence burden from a Coalition 
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Government that had been blind to the dangers from Japan and had left Australia 
very much unprepared, with its resources thinly spread over ‘far-flung’ 
battlefields.  Curtin rejected the idea that ‘the little islands to the north of Australia 
would be taken and that Upper Queensland and the Darwin area would be 
overrun by the enemy’—a reference to the ‘Brisbane Line’ controversy. 
He did not get away with these claims completely unchallenged.  The Daily 
Mirror, in a scathing editorial on his speech entitled ‘Some things Mr Curtin did 
not say’, commented: 
... the foundations on which Australia built and survived the greatest crisis in her 
history were laid by previous Governments, in the face of fierce opposition by 
Labor and from Mr Curtin himself.  Labor could not have done what has been done 
had those foundations not been laid ... .
24
 
 
From war Curtin moved on to promises of post-war reconstruction, 
development of social services and the active pursuit of full employment.  He 
claimed his Government had the full military and political support of the USA and 
had collaborated to strengthen ties with Britain.25  He also exploited ‘the divisions, 
intrigues and resulting incompetence of the previous administration’, attacking the 
dissension in the Opposition parties: 
In war and for the peace you cannot risk a non-Labour Government taking office.  
Who would be boss among them all?  Who would be the leader or leaders?  Who 
would decide the policy of this government for the UAP and CP?  Would it be Mr 
Fadden?  Well, he could not control 17 of his followers who formed the National 
Service Group.  Would it be Mr Menzies?  Of him I quote Mr Hughes: ‘He is the 
great self-seeker, the man behind the scenes in every intrigue, the fountain-head of 
every whispering campaign, the destroyer of unity’.
26
 
 
Curtin cleverly exploited the public brawls of the Opposition to increase a 
general perception of its ineptitude, and the ‘Brisbane Line’ controversy worked to 
substantiate the ALP’s charges of defeatism and incompetence.  The Opposition 
was unable to rally a convincing response, and whether the charges of defeatism 
were justified or not, they undoubtedly played a significant role in its subsequent 
election defeat. 
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Throughout the campaign Labor continued to focus on Curtin and his 
Government’s rescue of Australia from the defenceless state it claimed it was left 
in by the Coalition Government.  The ubiquitous pictures of a grave Curtin in the 
election advertising were followed by text on the ‘safety’ and ‘victory’ themes: ‘For 
20 months Labor has kept you safe.  The Labor Government is the victory 
Government’; ‘Labor has wiped out 2½ years of UAP neglect in 20 months.’  
Labor also attacked Opposition promises: ‘I do not promise unless I can fulfil.  I 
could have promised you all that Fadden and Menzies have promised but I have 
not done so.’ 
Claiming that the promises of the Opposition were inflationary and 
insubstantial, Curtin attacked what he called the Coalition’s ‘glamorous financial 
policies’ particularly the disputed post-war credits scheme, and other pledges 
that, he claimed, while ‘too vague’ to be reliably costed, would cost ‘tens of 
millions of pounds’.  He was however, sufficiently concerned by the Opposition’s 
charge that the ALP would ‘socialise’ Australia under the guise of wartime 
regulations to deny it strenuously, and to promise: ‘My Government will not during 
the war socialise any industry.’27 
In the controversy over defence preparations both sides gave figures to 
support their cases and both arguments had merit, but the ALP campaign was 
more forceful and appealing in its claims of success than was the UAP’s attempt 
to rebut charges of failure.  The Opposition’s replies to Labor accusations of 
defence neglect were based mainly on pointing out that when in Opposition the 
ALP had pursued a policy of isolationism, was anti-conscription and that the 
Coalition Governments, in the teeth of fierce Labor opposition, had laid sound 
foundations for defence measures:  ‘When the Fadden Government went out of 
office the foundations of Australia’s war effort had been well and deeply laid’.28  
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The Opposition also attacked the provisions of the Militia Bill, which had caused 
such an upheaval in its ranks: ‘the Labour Government believed in stopping 
Australian soldiers at the ‘Curtin Line’ on the Equator’.29 
The UAP campaign, in contrast to the positivism of the ALP, was aptly 
described by an IPA executive as a ‘necklace of negatives’.30  There were no 
major and continuing themes and the leaders were not featured or promoted in 
the advertising.  The UAP’s main thrusts were attacks on Labor’s record: failure 
to curb strikes; failure to procure a ‘single army’; excessive regulation, 
regimentation and bureaucracy; muddle in food production and manpower; close 
association with the communist party; failure to agree to a National Government; 
and ‘reckless’ inflationary policies.  Positive notes in the Coalition’s platform 
included a promise of ‘post-war reconstruction plans’, but without any specific 
strategy. 
The most powerful UAP campaign was in Victoria, where it was 
orchestrated by the Institute of Public Affairs(IPA).  By 1943 the IPA had replaced 
the National Union of Victoria as the primary supporting body of right-wing 
politics, though the National Union continued to exist until the late 1960s.31  The 
IPA had been established in 1942 by the Chamber of Manufactures in Victoria 
and in 1943 similar institutions were set up in New South Wales, South Australia 
and Queensland.32  The Institutes grew out of the alarm felt by the business world 
at the deterioration in public perception of business and industry, the advent of a 
Labor Government and the parlous state of the Coalition. 
A report commissioned by the Chamber found that ‘there was much overt 
hostility in Australian political and academic circles toward capitalism in general 
and big business in particular’.33  The report went on to blame the disintegration 
                                            
29
 Earle Page, quoted in the Canberra Times, 30 July 1943. 
30
 F E Lampe, Thoughts at Random on the Recent Election, nd., IPA Papers, Noel Butlin Archives 
Centre, ANU, Deposit N136/74 Secretary’s sundry correspondence. 
31
 Watson, op. cit., pp. 74-5. 
32
 IPA NSW papers, NLA MS 6590, Box 1. 
33
 C D Kemp, Report to the sub-committee of the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, nd., c. 1942, 
Noel Butlin Archives Centre, ANU, Deposit N136/53. 
68 
 
of the UAP to some extent for this situation, though the party’s problems could 
also be laid in part at the door of its backers, whose interest and activities waxed 
and waned in tune with elections, and who had resisted efforts to organise 
continuous interface with the constituencies.  It is also true that some of the 
party’s unpopularity was due to a public perception that it was controlled by 
sectional business interests who used their influence to select candidates and 
direct policy, and, as the report indicated, big business was not popular with the 
community.34 
The report convinced the Chamber of the need to educate the public about 
business and industry and it set up the IPA with a small professional staff and a 
council of fourteen leading businessmen, with the objectives of improving the 
negative public understanding of big business and to combat socialism.  An 
educational and public relations program to work towards these objectives was 
proposed, which ‘embodied an understanding to support the conservative 
political parties’, though the Institute claimed it was not a political body.35  The 
similarities to the Bureau proposed by Casey in 1931 are unmistakable and 
support the idea that the main problems of the UAP were its lack of political 
objectives and an organisational structure to work towards them. 
After a slow start the IPA in Victoria mounted an extensive campaign for the 
UAP, using posters, newspapers, and radio and cinema advertising.  Its Publicity 
and Research Bureau wrote and produced political broadcasts and shorter 
broadcasts, or ‘flashes’, on radio, provided speakers’ notes to all endorsed 
candidates and produced pamphlets and advertisements.36  While the IPA 
campaign in Victoria was vigorous it was unable to overcome such basic 
problems as the lack of positive policies and a poor image of the UAP leadership, 
resulting in a directionless campaign without a central theme except the anti-
                                            
34
 Aimer, op. cit., p. 222. 
35
 M. Bertram, A History of the Institute of Public Affairs, 1989, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, ANU, 
Deposit, N136/111. 
36
 M Bertram, Economic Prescriptions for a Post War World, September 1987, Noel Butlin Archives 
Centre, ANU, Deposit N136/110. 
69 
 
Labor emphasis.  Despite the efforts of the Victorian IPA, and though no seats 
were lost in the State, a reduced percentage of the vote indicated decreasing 
confidence in the UAP.  The NSW IPA also took some part in the election 
campaign in its State, but in a lower key than in Victoria, probably because it was 
not formed until February 1943.  Its main effort seems to have been in letters to 
the press on such anti-Labor topics as compulsory unionism, inflation, and 
nationalisation.37 
Analysis of the Victorian campaign, of which comprehensive records exist, 
contrasted the UAP’s negative and confused approach with the ALP’s strategy of 
concentrating on the twin themes of Curtin and the war effort.38  The UAP’s 
campaign commenced with a series of negative advertisements of anti-Labor 
propaganda, limp rebuttals of what it called the ‘Brisbane Lie’ and calls for a 
National Government.  It came unstuck early with the post-war credits debacle, 
then changed direction to a mixture of policy and more constructive but jumbled 
themes which gave an impression of political expediency and a party searching 
for a line of appeal. 
A good example of the unfocused and negative signals being sent out by 
the Coalition was an advertisement authorised by the CP, showing Evatt and 
Curtin attempting to camouflage a wall plastered with sixteen posters of anti-
Labor propaganda.  The message was lost in the multiplicity of negatives: 
regulations; communism; unions and prices; though the largest target was 
‘socialisation’.39 
Other advertising failed to find a unifying theme: ‘What of Britain?’ asked 
one,  ‘Stripped for action’ began another, referring to a future Coalition 
Government.  Anti-Labor sentiment was expressed in such phrases as ‘Planning 
for chaos’, ‘The ALP is leading Australia up the path to economic and financial 
chaos’, ‘The Curtin government has for 20 months been forcing social regulation 
                                            
37
 IPA NSW, NLA MS 6590, Box 7. 
38
 IPA Papers, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, ANU, Deposit N136/56. 
39
 Canberra Times, 17 August, 1943. 
70 
 
on the private lives of people.  No waistcoats, no trouser cuffs, no pink icing’, and 
ironically, in view of the lack of unity in the Coalition parties, advertising in June 
pleaded for ‘national unity and stability’ in its case for a National Government. 
After the post-war credits row in late July, the advertisements adopted a 
‘feel good’ tone, becoming sentimental and appealing to homely instincts, with a 
series of advertisements entitled ‘Family Circle’, showing cosy domestic scenes 
with such headings as ‘Labor would destroy families’, ‘To Australia’s men of 
tomorrow’, featuring two small boys; ‘Fireside reflection’, featuring a square-
jawed, solid looking male citizen thoughtfully smoking a pipe.  It was not until 
August that leaders were occasionally featured, and then only discreetly, with a 
picture of Fadden and the caption: ‘Fadden will end the food muddle’.40 
Even the more positive Coalition policies were badly presented.  The ‘one 
army’ issue was not generally popular with voters and the plea, or ‘banshee wail’ 
as one paper put it, for a National Government sounded hollow and insincere 
when the Opposition leaders could not even agree among themselves, while the 
public disagreement between Fadden and Menzies had robbed the post-war 
credits scheme of all credibility.41 
The tone of the advertising also drew criticism: ‘The propaganda of the 
Opposition exceeded the limits of decency in its destructiveness, alarmist and 
exaggerated nature and vindictiveness.’42  Hughes’ speech as leader of the UAP, 
reflects the scare-mongering which was a repetitive theme of the UAP’s 
campaign, using emotive words like ‘bondage’, ‘helpless victims’ and ‘menace’.  
In NSW the UAP campaign was considered to be ‘counter-productive’ and using 
‘gross exaggeration’. 43 
It was an uninspired election platform, relying largely on negative rhetoric 
and lacking overarching policy direction.  This approach had worked in the past, 
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while the ALP was suffering its own divisions, but was less convincing in 1943 
because of the publicity about the UAP’s problems and the general popularity of 
John Curtin and his Government.  The UAP had failed to develop beyond its early 
ideas of ‘sane’ finance and opposition to Labor because it could not develop an 
more explicit and recognisable political philosophy or build up a strong party 
organisation.  Its lack of commitment came through in a campaign that was 
overshadowed by the stridency of the ALP’s defence allegations and the debacle 
of the post-war credits dispute.  The UAP’s replies to the triumphant and 
continuous ALP accusations of defence neglect, while no doubt sincere and with 
more than a grain of truth, were weak and could not compete with the drama of 
the Brisbane Line allegations. 
Nor did the Coalition have a leader to rival the appeal of John Curtin as the 
‘saviour of Australia’.  Neither Fadden nor Hughes had the charisma of Curtin, 
while Menzies was considered to be unpopular with the public and perceived as 
less ‘Australian’ than Curtin.44  ‘Electors know that if Fadden wins, Menzies 
governs.  That is the biggest handicap for Fadden.’45  In contrast with an ALP 
campaign that constantly featured its popular leader, the UAP/CP advertising 
rarely mentioned their leaders.  In fact, Curtin’s name occurred more frequently in 
their advertising than the names of their own leaders. 
The disquietingly obvious absence of unity and sound or popular leadership 
in the UAP came through quite clearly in its unfocused campaign.  The mixed 
messages could only have had an alienating and confusing effect on voters, 
deterring even some who would have preferred to support right-wing parties.  The 
Coalition was unable or unwilling to promote its leaders because they lacked 
public appeal, and its negative advertising and unconvincing and uncontrolled 
attacks on Curtin and his Government revealed the barrenness at its political 
heart. 
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Records of post-election interviews, carried out by the IPA in Victoria, offer 
a rare insight into the minds of ordinary voters.  They cited as reasons for the 
UAP’s defeat: more confidence in Labor’s leaders and war administration; 
antagonism to Menzies and no confidence in Fadden: ‘Menzies is a snob’ 
‘Fadden is a blob’; a view of Hughes as too old; wrangling among the leaders; the 
Opposition’s organisational shortcomings; and disapproval of the ‘One Army’ 
policy.  It is clear that those interviewed had a perception of a disunited, 
discredited, and quarrelsome organisation, which, unable to govern itself, could 
not be trusted to govern the country.46 
The party’s inadequacies had led inexorably to a disturbed and 
disorganised parliamentary performance and open and inglorious public 
disagreements on leadership and policies.  The disagreements had erupted into 
the public arena where they damaged confidence in the party’s suitability as a 
Government.  At the same time the re-emergence of the ALP as a creditable 
body and its effective management of the crucial defence issues underlined the 
UAP’s instability and persuaded many right-wing voters to switch their allegiance. 
A significant feature of the 1943 election was the large number of 
independents who nominated and a plethora of new anti-Labor parties, such as 
the Services and Citizens Party in Victoria, the Liberal-Democratic and 
Commonwealth parties in NSW and the Queensland Peoples Party.47  ‘Take your 
choice from 27 parties’ blazed one headline.48  At the election 339 candidates 
nominated for the available 74 seats in the House of Representatives and seven 
minor parties put up candidates.49  The phenomenon was interpreted as an 
expression of concern over the state of the Opposition parties, as dissatisfied 
right-wing citizens searched for an alternative to the ALP.50  In the event, the 
independents did not poll well, nor did the new parties have any success, but 
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they did split the conservative vote.  Despite preferences that helped to restore 
some balance to the election result, almost 15% of the voters—largely previous 
supporters of the non-Labor parties—favoured independents or mushroom minor 
parties. 
The election result was an overwhelming victory for Labor and a crushing 
blow to the UAP.  ‘Deluge’, ‘Landslide’, ‘Tidal wave’, ‘Unprecedented triumph for 
Labor’, ‘humiliating debacle’, ‘most serious defeat’, ‘Disastrous defeat’, were 
words used to describe the results as Labor triumphed in a spectacular two-
Chamber victory.  The ALP received 49.93 per cent of the total valid vote, which 
gave them 49 seats in the House of Representatives.  The UAP attracted only 
16.05% of the valid vote, and the CP in its various guises 17.03%; giving the 
Opposition 23 seats.  The swing occurred in three States, NSW, SA, WA and less 
dramatically in Tasmania, while Curtin had a personal triumph in Fremantle, 
receiving a vote four times the size of his opponent F R Lee, an Independent 
Nationalist.51  The NSG did not fare well, Duncan-Hughes, Price and Stacey in 
South Australia and Beck in Tasmania lost their seats.  W V McCall, whose seat 
of Martin attracted eleven candidates, was also defeated.52 
It was a convincing mandate for Prime Minister Curtin and carried a 
resounding message to the conservative forces, but especially to the UAP, that 
they had completely lost the confidence of the country.  It was a message that 
Bob Menzies for one was to take to heart.
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The major cause of the UAP collapse was its lack of a clearly articulated political 
faith.  This was compounded by the absence of a federal organisation to develop 
and define political principles, coordinate state and federal supporters and give 
the party a focal point. 
These primary causes of the party’s collapse, which was foreshadowed by 
a decline in electoral support through the nineteen-thirties, can be traced back to 
the party’s origins in 1931, described by Edgar Holt, a political journalist and 
director of federal public relations for the Liberal Party, as ‘rootless and artificial’.1 
The UAP’s dependence on its leader and its negative approach to policy 
were not enough to formulate a party culture and the fundamental dynamics of 
destruction incorporated in its structure, with dissidence and political apathy the 
major symptoms, began to erode its foundations even before the death of Lyons.  
Its resistance to the development of a supportive extra-parliamentary 
organisation ensured that the federal UAP remained ideologically bankrupt and 
prevented it from developing into a ‘party’ in the accepted political sense of a 
national organisation with branches, officers, rules and a policy platform.  Lyons’ 
demise in 1939 removed an essential prop to the party and its inherent instability 
was exposed in its failure to unite under a new and more dynamic leadership. 
Political parties have survived electoral reverses in the past: Labor 
recovered from its electoral disaster of 1931 and the Liberals their defeat in 1972.  
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But the UAP did not survive the loss of the 1943 election, even though it 
achieved a respectable proportion of the vote.  In Victoria, where the IPA carried 
out a more vigorous campaign on its behalf than was apparent in the rest of the 
country, the UAP retained all its seats, though with a reduced percentage of the 
vote, while the ALP did not achieve any increase in its support.2 
The new Liberal Party, which later attracted increasing support from right-
wing voters, absorbed most of the members of the defunct UAP and ‘retained its 
emphasis on private enterprise and individual initiative’.3  But it also agreed to 
build an Australia-wide organisation and formulate a clear statement of political 
faith.4  Its success supports the conclusion that the UAP collapsed because it 
failed to develop a coherent political philosophy to give it purpose and a federal 
body to give it direction. 
The lessons to be learned from the collapse of the UAP were that a political 
party cannot operate without clearly articulated policies developed in consultation 
with a supporting national extra-parliamentary organisation, which also manages 
party funds and provides feedback from the constituencies as well as strong 
Parliamentary candidates. 
These lessons were taken to heart by Robert Menzies and those who 
worked towards the formation of the Liberal Party of Australia(LPA) that 
succeeded the UAP in 1945.  The structure of the new LPA was deliberately 
formulated to avoid the organisational inadequacies of the UAP.  Menzies, in his 
speech at a Conference on 13 October 1944 to consider the establishment of the 
new right-wing party, said ‘a common organisation outside Parliament is 
absolutely imperative’ and spoke of the need for a ‘political faith’ instead of ‘a 
policy of negation’.  The LPA was to have a clearly formulated policy platform, a 
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sound federal organisation and fund raising methods that were not dependent on 
donations from outside interests.5
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